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of Relief after Fry v Napoleon Community 
Schools 
Katherine Bruce† 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federal statute 
that protects the rights of students with disabilities by conferring onto them a 
substantive right to a free, appropriate public education (FAPE). Under the 
IDEA, aggrieved parents may demand a “due process hearing,” an administrative 
process presided over by an impartial hearing officer through which students and 
families may seek redress for violations of the IDEA. Due process hearings, how-
ever, allow only for certain types of relief—notably, money damages are not availa-
ble under the IDEA. Students with disabilities are also protected under other stat-
utes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. Parents may sue under these sister statutes but, in most cases, must 
first exhaust their administrative remedies by seeking a due process hearing pur-
suant to 20 USC § 1415(l). 
This Comment addresses an unanswered question about § 1415(l) that the 
Supreme Court explicitly left unaddressed in its recent decision in Fry v Napoleon 
Community Schools: if a family alleges a denial of a FAPE—which Fry held trig-
gered exhaustion—but sought relief that the IDEA could not provide, including 
money damages, is exhaustion required? With respect to this question, the lower 
courts are split.  
By applying principles of statutory interpretation, examining the history of 
the IDEA, and considering the policy implications of exhaustion, this Comment 
argues that exhaustion should not be required in such a case. This conclusion is 
first rooted in the plain-language reading of the statute, a reading that is con-
firmed by comparing § 1415(l) to other federal statutes and to the ADA and § 504. 
Moreover, considering the kinds of cases in which this question would arise by 
applying the Fry standard reveals that waiving exhaustion in such a case creates 
appropriate deterrence for schools and school districts. Consistent with the core 
purpose of the IDEA, such a reading of the statute better vindicates the rights of 
students with disabilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Abraham is a young student with Down syndrome living in 
Los Angeles.1 He attends a specialized school for students with 
unique educational needs. This placement allows Abraham to 
receive tailored educational services but also segregates him 
from nondisabled peers. That trade-off is a constant compromise 
for families and educators of disabled children, but things seem 
to be going fine for Abraham. That is, until 2014, when fourth-
grade Abraham comes home from school with large bruises on 
his forehead. His perplexed mother does not receive any expla-
nation from school. Even more alarming, Abraham becomes 
deeply fearful of going to physical education class, which, for 
 
 1 These facts are based on Abraham P. v Los Angeles Unified School District, 2017 
WL 4839071, *1–3 (CD Cal). 
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many elementary school students, is the most exciting part of 
the day. 
For the next two school years, the problem escalates. 
Abraham’s behavior is getting worse, and his parents hear rep-
orts of him kicking and spitting at his classmates and teachers. 
At the same time, Abraham remains terrified of going to school. 
He comes home bruised, sometimes from self-inflicted injuries, 
and the staff reports that he has urinated on himself. His par-
ents are flummoxed, and their complaints to the school and to 
the police have yielded no action. However, their child has par-
ticularized educational needs that not every school is equipped 
to respond to, leaving them with few alternatives. 
Abraham finally reports to his parents that the school bus 
aide and his teacher have both hit him on several occasions. 
Horrified, they refuse to send him back to school. Eventually, 
after several rounds of discussion with the school district, they 
are able to negotiate a different placement, and, thankfully, 
Abraham’s fears of school dissipate. But his parents nonetheless 
turn to the justice system—there have been fundamental 
wrongs committed against their child, and they want justice for 
him. What is the proper relief for Abraham and his family? And 
what steps are required to obtain it? 
In the United States, 6.6 million students, or 13 percent of 
total public-school enrollment, receive special education ser-
vices.2 Those children are protected under several statutes, but 
the primary vehicle for guaranteeing that students with disabil-
ities are provided with a quality education is the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act3 (IDEA). States that receive fed-
eral funding under the IDEA are required to provide students with 
disabilities with a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE).4 
The notion that disabled students deserve a quality educa-
tion was not always the status quo in the United States. Before 
the IDEA, disabled children “were excluded entirely from the 
public school system and from being educated with their peers,” 
“undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a 
successful educational experience,” and “a lack of adequate res-
ources within the public school system forced families to find 
 
 2 Children and Youth with Disabilities (National Center for Education Statistics, 
May 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T7CV-DMXC. 
 3 Pub L No 101-476, 104 Stat 1103 (1990), codified as amended at 20 USC § 1400 
et seq. 
 4 20 USC § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
990 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:987 
 
services outside the public school system.”5 The IDEA has not 
entirely eliminated these problems. But, at the very least, the 
IDEA created a special education system that better protects 
disabled students and, crucially, provided a mechanism by 
which parents can demand that their children be adequately 
served by their public school system. Nevertheless, schools can 
and do fail their most vulnerable students. Sometimes those 
failures are especially shocking, as in Abraham’s case. Indeed, 
Abraham’s case was not an apocryphal story from a time be-
fore the IDEA; his case was decided by the Central District of 
California in October 2017.6 
The procedural safeguards of the IDEA create a roadmap for 
parents and families to vindicate the rights of their disabled 
children, but that roadmap does not lead straight to court. Be-
fore a parent may file a complaint, she must exhaust the admin-
istrative remedies available under the statute.7 Although there 
are some exceptions to that principle, “the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement remains the general rule.”8 But the IDEA is not the 
only statute that protects students with disabilities in school—
parents may sue under the IDEA’s sister statutes as well. The 
question of when a parent is required to exhaust administrative 
remedies in these sister-statute cases was unclear until recently, 
when it was answered by Fry v Napoleon Community Schools.9 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that when a complaint 
alleges the denial of a FAPE—regardless of whether the com-
plaint invokes the IDEA or a related statute—exhaustion is 
required.10 
Two footnotes in Fry posed the question that this Comment 
addresses. In footnote four and footnote eight of the opinion, 
Justice Elena Kagan was careful to clarify that the Court was de-
clining to decide the following: “Is exhaustion required when the 
plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific rem-
edy she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—
is not one that an IDEA hearing officer may award?”11 This 
Comment seeks to answer that question. 
 
 5 20 USC § 1400(c)(2)(B)–(D). 
 6 See generally Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071. 
 7 See 20 USC § 1415(l). 
 8 M.P. v Independent School District No 721, 326 F3d 975, 980 (8th Cir 2003). 
 9 137 S Ct 743 (2017). 
 10 Id at 752. 
 11 Id at 752 n 4. See also id at 754 n 8 (“[W]e do not address here . . . a case in 
which a plaintiff, although charging the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy that 
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To begin, Part I outlines the legal landscape within which 
this question is situated, including the IDEA, the IDEA’s sis-
ter statutes, and Fry. Part II discusses the pre-Fry case law 
and the circuit split over this lingering question. Part III sug-
gests an answer to the question that Fry’s footnotes left for 
another day. This Comment concludes that the correct answer 
is no—exhaustion should be waived in cases in which the 
plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but requests a form of relief 
that is unavailable under the IDEA. This solution is rooted in 
statutory interpretation, the purpose of the statute, and policy 
considerations. 
I.  LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 
The IDEA is the primary vehicle for protecting American 
children with disabilities in schools, but it is not the only law 
that does so. Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act12 
(ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act13 can proceed without 
recourse to the IDEA’s procedural safeguards due to the addi-
tion of § 1415(l) to the IDEA in 1990. Importantly, the kinds of 
relief available under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act differ 
from those forms of relief available under the IDEA. This Part 
details the history and protections of the IDEA, provides an 
overview of the related provisions and their connection to the 
IDEA, and discusses how Fry changes the landscape of evaluat-
ing IDEA complaints. 
A. The IDEA 
The IDEA originated as the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act14 (EHA) in 1975. Congress passed this law in res-
ponse to classrooms and teachers that were ill equipped to edu-
cate children with differing needs. Congress designed the EHA 
as a framework of federal protections to ensure that public 
schools invested in teaching children with disabilities. The Act 
conditioned the receipt of federal funds on compliance with its 
 
an IDEA officer cannot give—for example, as in the Frys’ complaint, money damages for 
resulting emotional injury.”). 
 12 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 13 Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355 (1973), codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq. 
 14 Pub L No 94-142, 89 Stat 773 (1975), codified at 20 USC § 1400 et seq. 
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provisions.15 The secretary of education gives to compliant states 
special education assistance grants that are proportionate to 
the number of students receiving special education services in 
that state.16 In 1990, the Act was renamed the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act.17 
Under the IDEA, eligible children must have a disability 
that falls under one of the following categories: intellectual dis-
abilities, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, 
visual impairments, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impair-
ments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impair-
ments (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) falls 
under this vaguely worded category), or specific learning disabil-
ities.18 A child is eligible if, by reason of such a disability, she 
requires “special education and related services.”19 
The “centerpiece of the [IDEA’s] education delivery system 
for disabled children” is the individualized education program 
(IEP).20 An IEP team, consisting of school and district officials 
and the child’s parents, creates a child’s IEP.21 The team confers 
at least yearly to decide which required accommodations, 
modifications, and related services the individual child needs 
to receive an adequate public education.22 Accommodations, 
modifications, and related services may include such services as: 
a paraprofessional aide; time with the school social worker, occ-
upational therapist, physical therapist, or other service provider; 
preferential seating in the classroom; adaptive technology; and 
partial- or full-day teaching in a special education classroom.23 
The IEP is memorialized in a document that travels with the 
child from district to district; every school is bound to, at mini-
mum, implement the IEP as written.24 
 
 15 See 20 USC §§ 1411–12. Note that except when the differences are relevant, this 
Comment does not distinguish between the EHA and the IDEA. “IDEA” refers to the 
current state of the law regardless of when the individual provision was passed. 
 16 See 20 USC § 1411. 
 17 IDEA § 901(a)(1)–(3), 104 Stat at 1141–42, 20 USC § 1400(a). 
 18 20 USC § 1401(3)(A)(i). 
 19 20 USC § 1401(3)(A)(ii). 
 20 Honig v Doe, 484 US 305, 311 (1988). 
 21 20 USC § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 22 20 USC § 1414(d)(4). 
 23 See 20 USC § 1401(26)(A). For the required components of the IEP, see 20 USC 
§ 1414(d); 34 CFR § 300.320. 
 24 Courts differ as to the proper standard for evaluating improper-implementation 
claims. As a general matter, courts are more willing to forgive minor mistakes in imple-
mentation but largely require faithful adherence to an IEP’s terms. See, for example, 
Houston Independent School District v Bobby R., 200 F3d 341, 349 (5th Cir 2000) (holding 
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Crucially, the IEP team structure is designed to ensure 
individualization, and the menu of services available to the team 
is broad. However, the team is bound by certain limiting princi-
ples. In particular, the IEP must ensure that each child is in his 
or her “least restrictive environment.”25 That is, a child must be 
integrated into the general education setting with reasonable, 
appropriate support to the greatest extent possible.26 This provi-
sion is designed to prevent the languishing effect noticed by 
Congress in 1975, wherein special education students shunted to 
an alternative classroom were segregated, sometimes needlessly, 
from their nondisabled peers.27 
The IDEA promises that, thanks to their IEP, every covered 
student shall receive a FAPE.28 Once a child is eligible under the 
IDEA, she acquires a “substantive right” to a FAPE.29 The pre-
cise contours of the FAPE standard have been mapped out in 
case law. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central 
School District, Westchester County v Rowley,30 an early case ad-
dressing the FAPE standard, held that a child receives a FAPE 
when her program is “reasonably calculated to enable the child 
to receive educational benefits.”31 This was a victory for disabled 
students in some sense because the school district argued that 
the FAPE requirement was not a substantive requirement at all; 
that holding would have rendered the IDEA toothless. Nonethe-
less, courts disagreed on the exact meanings of “reasonably cal-
culated” and “educational benefits” for decades. Rowley made 
clear that schoolchildren with IEPs were not necessarily entitled 
to make progress commensurate with their nondisabled peers.32 
 
that the plaintiffs’ allegation of a failure to implement the IEP must show that the fail-
ure was more than de minimis); Van Duyn v Baker School District 5J, 502 F3d 811, 819 
(9th Cir 2007) (“[O]nly material failures to implement an IEP constitute violations of the 
IDEA.”). 
 25 20 USC § 1412(a)(5). 
 26 20 USC § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 27 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, HR Rep No 94-332, 
94th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1975) (“In 1966, . . . only about one-third of the approximately 5.5 
million handicapped children were being provided an appropriate special education. The 
remaining two-thirds were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idle in regular 
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’”). 
 28 20 USC § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
 29 Fry, 137 S Ct at 749. 
 30 458 US 176 (1982). 
 31 Id at 207. This standard applies if the IEP was properly constructed through the 
procedures of the Act. Procedural deficiencies may also be the basis for legal recourse. Id 
at 206. 
 32 See id at 198. 
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Some courts determined that a FAPE nonetheless entitled the 
student to meaningful educational benefits, while others sug-
gested that educational benefits had to be merely more than de 
minimis (some benefit as opposed to no benefits).33 
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split and defined a 
FAPE more precisely in the 2017 case Endrew F. v Douglas 
County School District RE-1.34 Per the Endrew F. court, to meet 
the FAPE requirement, “a school must offer an IEP reasonably 
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in 
light of the child’s circumstances.”35 Consistent with the IDEA’s 
emphasis on individualization, determining whether a district 
has provided a FAPE post–Endrew F. requires holistic consider-
ation of a student’s circumstances and of what progress should 
look like for that child.36 Albeit far from a bright-line rule, “this 
standard is markedly more demanding than the ‘merely more 
than de minimis’” standard proffered by several lower courts.37 
A parent alleging that her child’s school has failed to pro-
vide a FAPE—whether by crafting a deficient IEP, failing to 
comprehensively implement the IEP, or failing to identify that 
her child needed an IEP38—may seek recourse for the school’s 
failures via the procedural safeguards of the IDEA.39 The parent 
or another education rights holder may file a complaint with her 
state educational agency, initiating a procedure known as a “due 
process hearing.”40 Procedural requirements are crafted by each 
state’s education agency and thus vary state to state.41 
For a sampling of what procedural safeguards look like in 
some of the largest school districts in the country, consider first 
 
 33 Compare, for example, Deal v Hamilton County Board of Education, 392 F3d 
840, 861–63 (6th Cir 2004) (“IDEA requires an IEP to confer a meaningful educational 
benefit gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue.”) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted), with Sytsema v Academy School District No 20, 538 F3d 1306, 1313 
(10th Cir 2008) (“This court has interpreted the Rowley standard to require an educa-
tional benefit that is more than de minimis.”). 
 34 137 S Ct 988 (2017). 
 35 Id at 999. 
 36 Id at 999–1000. 
 37 Id at 1000. 
 38 Schools are required to identify children who may need special education ser-
vices under the IDEA’s “Child Find” provision. 20 USC § 1412(a)(3). 
 39 See 20 USC § 1415. 
 40 20 USC § 1415(f). 
 41 See 20 USC § 1415(a) (delegating to state authorities the responsibility to “estab-
lish and maintain procedures” to ensure that students with disabilities and their fami-
lies are “guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appro-
priate public education”). 
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Chicago Public Schools (CPS) (371,382 students in school year 
2017–2018, 13.7 percent of whom have IEPs).42 CPS students 
have the option of filing a complaint with the Illinois State 
Board of Education, which will then initiate an investigation 
and render a conclusion that may or may not include a recom-
mendation for a remedy.43 They may also or instead file a formal 
due process request, which will initiate a hearing presided over 
by an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO).44 Parents may alterna-
tively or additionally request mediation.45 By contrast, in New 
York City (more than 1,000,000 students enrolled in school year 
2016–2017, of whom 221,198 students, or 19.4 percent, have 
disabilities),46 the Department of Education first requires an ini-
tial hearing. Either the parent or the district may appeal to a 
state review officer from the New York State Department of 
Education within thirty days of the decision.47 Finally, in the Los 
Angeles Unified School District (more than 633,000 students in 
school year 2016–2017, of whom 12 percent receive special edu-
cation services),48 mediation is generally required as a prerequi-
site to a hearing; after that additional step, the hearing proceeds 
similarly to other states.49 
This overview of procedural safeguards in several large 
school districts across the country illustrates the steps parents 
must take before vindicating their rights in court. The adminis-
trative process “generally mirrors the procedural and adversar-
ial nature of an action in civil court, resulting in an elongated 
trial-like process.”50 Like a lawsuit, the process begins with a 
 
 42 CPS Stats and Facts (Chicago Public Schools), archived at 
http://perma.cc/25WY-WKX4. 
 43 Procedural Safeguards and Parental Supports (Chicago Public Schools), archived 
at http://perma.cc/J6ZU-NBQB. 
 44 How to Address Concerns: The Dispute Process (Chicago Public Schools), archived 
at http://perma.cc/UZC3-2MJX. 
 45 Id. 
 46 NYC Department of Education, Annual Enrollment Snapshot, online at 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/data/default.htm (visited Mar 25, 2018) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable) (Demographic Snapshots spreadsheet). 
 47 NYC Department of Education, Family Guide to Special Education Services for 
School-Age Children: A Shared Path to Success *38–39, archived at 
http://perma.cc/G2NF-AUEE. 
 48 Los Angeles Unified (Ed Data), archived at http://perma.cc/P264-KD2R. 
 49 California Office of Administrative Hearings, Special Education Handbook *14–
15 (2016), archived at http://perma.cc/S2QU-QHRR. 
 50 Kent Sparks, Comment, Requiring Administrative Exhaustion While the School 
Shuts Down: An Insurmountable Barrier to Seeking IDEA Enforcement, 2014 Mich St L 
Rev 1161, 1173. 
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formal complaint, which triggers often lengthy procedural 
steps.51 At the hearing itself, complainants have the right to rep-
resentation by counsel,52 the right to a transcript of the proceed-
ings,53 and “the right to present evidence and confront, cross-
examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”54 As such, 
while not a civil lawsuit, a due process hearing can still be a 
costly and drawn-out process. 
There are strong arguments in favor of the due process 
hearing: the impartial hearing officers have deep expertise in 
this area of the law, judicial efficiency is promoted by filtering 
out some cases, and state agencies have an interest in resolving 
education disputes, to name a few.55 Nonetheless, there are 
sometimes compelling reasons to waive exhaustion, which would 
permit the aggrieved party to go straight to court to redress 
their claims. The general standard is that exhaustion can be 
waived when its pursuit would be “futile or inadequate.”56 This 
standard is not unique to the IDEA; in some other administra-
tive contexts, courts also ask whether exhaustion would be futile 
or inadequate to determine whether waiver is appropriate.57 
If the student prevails at the due process hearing, the relief 
to which she is entitled may take several forms. Relief available 
under the IDEA is equitable in nature, and courts have “broad dis-
cretion” to craft an appropriate remedy.58 IHOs commonly grant 
compensatory education, meaning “education services designed to 
 
 51 Andria B. Saia, Meeting Special Needs: Special Education Due Process Hearings, 
79 Pa Bar Assoc Q 1, 3–6 (2008) (describing the steps to IDEA procedural safeguards 
and noting that procedural safeguards under the IDEA mandate “a process that is very 
much like the filing of any civil complaint” and that the timeline for a due process hear-
ing is “rarely, if ever, met”). 
 52 20 USC § 1415(h)(1). 
 53 20 USC § 1415(h)(3). 
 54 20 USC § 1415(h)(2). 
 55 For further discussion of these arguments, see Part III.C.5. 
 56 Honig, 484 US at 327. Inadequacy exceptions arise when “structural, systemic 
reforms are sought” or when the substantive claims challenge the administrative proceed-
ings themselves. Hoeft v Tucson Unified School District, 967 F2d 1298, 1309 (9th Cir 1992). 
 57 See, for example, Holt v Town of Stonington, 765 F3d 127, 130 (2d Cir 2014) 
(stating that futility and inadequacy are exceptions to the administrative exhaustion re-
quirement in a state zoning dispute); Citadel Securities, LLC v Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, Inc, 808 F3d 694, 700 (7th Cir 2015) (applying the “futile or inadequate” 
standard to Securities and Exchange Commission administrative procedures). 
 58 Florence County School District Four v Carter, 510 US 7, 16 (1993), quoting School 
Committee of the Town of Burlington v Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 US 
359, 369 (1985). 
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make up for past deficiencies in a child’s program.”59 However, 
relief can also include tuition reimbursement for a student’s pri-
vate school placement after a unilateral transfer,60 prospective 
changes to the IEP, or reimbursement for an independent edu-
cational evaluation.61 One study of IHO decisions found that, of 
the due process hearings in which the IHO granted relief for the 
denial of a FAPE, 44 percent provided tuition reimbursement 
and 39 percent provided compensatory education (these catego-
ries are not mutually exclusive; an IHO may give both).62 Cru-
cially, however, compensatory and punitive damages are not 
available under the IDEA.63 That is, parents may not receive a 
pure payout through a due process procedure, but they may re-
ceive educational services or funding earmarked specifically for 
educational services (both of which would fall under compensa-
tory education). 
B. Related Statutes: The ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act 
The IDEA is not the only statute that protects children with 
disabilities. Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act perform similar functions. The relevant provision of the 
ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or ac-
tivities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by 
any such entity.”64 Section 504 states that no individual “shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fin-
ancial assistance.”65 
 
 59 Boose v District of Columbia, 786 F3d 1054, 1056 (DC Cir 2015), citing Reid v 
District of Columbia, 401 F3d 516, 522–23 (DC Cir 2005). 
 60 See Burlington, 471 US at 369. 
 61 20 USC § 1415(b)(1). 
 62 Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE under the IDEA, 33 J 
Natl Assoc Admin L Judiciary 214, 229 (2013). 
 63 See Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements 
and Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J 
Natl Assoc Admin L Judiciary 349, 365 (2009). 
 64 42 USC § 12132. 
 65 Rehabilitation Act § 504, 87 Stat at 394, 29 USC § 794(a). 
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In practice, the ADA and § 504 cover more individuals with 
disabilities than the IDEA does. Students eligible under the 
IDEA must have a disability that specifically causes them to re-
quire special education services, whereas under the ADA and 
§ 504, the disability need only interfere with a major life activity 
(not necessarily education).66 Moreover, the ADA Amendments 
Act of 200867 added the expansive qualifier to the ADA that 
“[t]he definition of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of 
broad coverage of individuals.”68 As a result, students with IEPs 
may often be entitled to coverage under § 504 and the ADA. The 
reverse, however, is true only if the student’s needs fit under the 
IDEA’s more confined definition. Section 504 in particular is 
widely used in schools to institute accommodations for IDEA-
ineligible students through the creation of “504 plans.” Not un-
like an IEP, a 504 plan memorializes the accommodations that a 
child’s school commits to provide so that the child receives a 
FAPE. The requirements of a 504 plan are not as stringent as 
the IEP and do not necessarily need to be in writing.69 
The EHA (the IDEA’s precursor) originally precluded re-
course under its sister statutes. In Smith v Robinson,70 the 
Supreme Court held that “Congress intended the EHA to be the 
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal 
protection claim to a publicly financed special education.”71 The 
Court reasoned that the EHA scheme was comprehensive and 
holding otherwise would render the procedures of the statute 
superfluous.72 Congress disagreed and responded by passing the 
Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986.73 That act amen-
ded the EHA by adding § 1415(l), which expressly permits reme-
dies “under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
 66 Compare 20 USC § 1401(3)(A) (defining the group of people eligible under the 
IDEA as those children with a qualifying disability who require special education ser-
vices), with 42 USC § 12102(1) (defining an individual with a disability under the ADA 
as a person with a physical or mental impairment for whom that disability limits a 
major life activity). See also 29 USC § 705(20)(B) (stating that the definition of “individ-
ual with a disability” for most provisions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act corresponds to 
the ADA’s definition of the same). 
 67 Pub L No 110-325, 122 Stat 3553, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 68 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3(4)(A), 122 Stat at 3555. 
 69 See Protecting Students with Disabilities (Department of Education), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M49R-HRCZ. 
 70 468 US 992 (1984). 
 71 Id at 1009. 
 72 See id at 1009–11. 
 73 Pub L No 99-372, 100 Stat 796, codified at 20 USC § 1415. 
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of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Fede-
ral laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.”74 
However, IDEA procedures still must be exhausted if the 
plaintiff is “seeking relief that is also available” under the IDEA.75 
C. Fry 
Because of the interplay between the ADA, § 504, and the 
IDEA, it remained unclear until recently whether claims 
brought under the related statutes required exhaustion. Courts 
of appeals suggested different approaches to determining when 
exhaustion was required, but the Supreme Court resolved the 
question in Fry. In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, the 
Court held that exhaustion is required “when the gravamen of a 
complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide a FAPE.”76 
In Fry, the student, E.F., disputed her district’s decision to 
bar her goldendoodle, Wonder, from accompanying her to school. 
The school argued that all of her educational needs were being 
met by a one-on-one aide, rendering the dog superfluous. Her 
parents filed a complaint with the US Department of Education 
Office of Civil Rights, which issued a decision that found that, 
under Title II of the ADA and § 504, the school discriminated 
against E.F. even if the FAPE standard was met. The Frys 
therefore sued under Title II and § 504, but not the IDEA.77 The 
district court dismissed the action, citing the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.78 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of when exhaus-
tion was required for education-related suits under related stat-
utes or the Constitution.79 
The Court first held that exhaustion is required only when 
the plaintiff is seeking relief for denial of a FAPE. A hearing 
officer, the Court reasoned, cannot give relief for anything else.80 
Nonetheless, a school’s conduct toward a disabled child may still 
cause a cognizable injury other than denying her a FAPE; in 
such a case, exhaustion is unnecessary.81 The Court then held 
 
 74 20 USC § 1415(l). 
 75 20 USC § 1415(l). 
 76 Fry, 137 S Ct at 755. 
 77 Id at 751–52. 
 78 Id at 752. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Fry, 137 S Ct at 753. 
 81 Id at 754. 
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that in determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the den-
ial of a FAPE, one must look to the gravamen of the plaintiff’s 
complaint.82 It matters not that the complaint failed to evoke the 
IDEA. What matters is whether the complainant “is in essence 
contesting the adequacy of a special education program.”83 One 
tool the Court suggested was to ask whether the plaintiff could 
have brought the same complaint with respect to another type of 
public facility. If the complaint is uniquely school related, then it 
probably does concern a FAPE.84 The Court also suggested that 
if an adult at the school could bring the same claim, the plaintiff 
is less likely to have alleged a denial of a FAPE.85 
The Court remanded E.F.’s case to the court below, but im-
plied that the facts as alleged did not constitute a denial of a 
FAPE. The Frys never claimed that E.F.’s educational services 
or IEP were deficient; indeed, the one-on-one human aide satis-
fied all of her educational needs.86 Instead, they alleged that “the 
school districts infringed E.F.’s right to equal access” even as 
they complied with the IDEA.87 However, the possibility re-
mained that the Frys’ pursuit of IDEA remedies prior to this lit-
igation constituted evidence that the gravamen of the complaint 
was a denial of a FAPE.88 
The contours of what kinds of complaints allege a denial of a 
FAPE are not yet well defined in the lower courts.89 Assuming 
the Fry family never sought IDEA relief, the facts of Fry are 
probably the paradigmatic non-FAPE case. By all accounts, E.F. 
and her parents were content with the IEP, and the school im-
plemented the IEP completely. The problem was physical access 
to the facility itself, not the content of E.F.’s education. While 
lack of access to the school building is peripherally related to 
access to educational content, this case is easily decided by the 
questions posed by Kagan: Would this be cognizable if it oc-
curred in a different public sphere? Yes, if a library denied entry 
 
 82 Id at 755. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Fry, 137 S Ct at 756. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id at 758. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See Fry, 137 S Ct at 758. 
 89 For further discussion of how the lower courts have treated Fry and the issues 
that have arisen with respect to delineating FAPE from non-FAPE allegations, see 
Part III.C. 
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to a person’s service dog, that person could sue under the ADA.90 
Could an adult in the building bring the same claim? Also yes—
if a teacher’s service dog were denied entry, she too would have 
a case.91 
But the question whether a complaint alleges denial of a 
FAPE becomes less clear if the injury is more obviously connec-
ted to the educational program. For example, if a child has re-
straint procedures92 in his IEP, and he is injured in the course of 
a faulty restraint, then the injury is intertwined with his educa-
tional program. Yet, that injury could have conceivably occurred 
in a library or theater, as well. This ambiguity is being ironed 
out in lower courts, but this Comment contends that cases like 
the above example should be considered a denial of a FAPE.93 
And in some cases, even if a FAPE is implicated, exhaustion 
should nonetheless be waived when the relief sought cannot be 
granted by an IHO.94 
II.  DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ROLE OF RELIEF 
In two footnotes, the Fry Court expressly left open the fol-
lowing question: If a complaint alleges the denial of a FAPE, but 
seeks a form of relief unavailable under the IDEA, such as com-
pensatory or punitive damages, does the student still need to 
exhaust administrative remedies? In footnote four, the Court 
noted that “[t]he Frys, along with the Solicitor General, say the 
answer is no.”95 It reiterates the open question in footnote eight: 
Once again, we do not address here (or anywhere else in 
this opinion) a case in which a plaintiff, although charging 
the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy that an IDEA 
 
 90 See, for example, Spector v Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 US 119, 128 (2005) 
(“Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal 
enjoyment of public accommodations.”), citing 42 USC § 12182(a). 
 91 See Spector, 545 US at 128. 
 92 Under certain circumstances, a student’s safety or that of others might require a 
school official to physically restrain a student. For a summary of all states’ rules on these 
kinds of procedures, see generally US Department of Education, Summary of Seclusion 
and Restraint Statutes, Regulations, Policies and Guidance, by State and Territory: 
Information as Reported to the Regional Comprehensive Centers and Gathered from 
Other Sources (Feb 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/7DF8-ALZ9. 
 93 See Part III. 
 94 For more discussion of the tension between the clues in Fry and education-
related injuries, see Part III.C.1. 
 95 Fry, 137 S Ct at 752 n 4. See also generally Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, Docket No 15-497 (US filed Aug 29, 2016) 
(available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4524537) (“Solicitor General Brief ”). 
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officer cannot give—for example, as in the Frys’ complaint, 
money damages for resulting emotional injury.96 
This lingering uncertainty is the question at the heart of 
this Comment. This Part begins by detailing the opinions of cir-
cuit courts that have explicitly reached the question. Before and 
after Fry, most circuit courts that had ruled on the issue re-
quired exhaustion. But Fry explicitly left this particular ques-
tion open; Parts II.A–C attempt to unfold how the circuits stand 
in the wake of that case. 
After evaluating the appellate-court precedent, Part II.D 
examines a subset of cases in which exhaustion was waived for 
reasons unrelated to the relief sought. Fry calls these cases into 
question. 
A. Circuits That Have Explicitly Rejected Waiving Exhaustion 
on the Basis of Unavailable Relief 
In Charlie F. v Board of Education of Skokie School District 
68,97 the Seventh Circuit conceded that compensatory damages 
are not available as relief under the IDEA but nonetheless re-
quired exhaustion. The court reasoned that the due process pro-
ceedings might be able to provide relief.98 In that case, the young 
Charlie F. was happy with his present education plan but sued 
under § 504, the Constitution, and the ADA over humiliating 
experiences in the prior grade.99 The Seventh Circuit refused to 
allow the family to skip the due process hearing because the 
injury was educational in nature.100 Note that this is not the ap-
proach in Fry, which abrogated Charlie F. by rejecting the injury-
centered approach to exhaustion as a general matter and in-
stead embraced an inquiry focused on whether the complaint 
alleged a denial of a FAPE. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit’s 
general rejection of the relevance of the prayer for relief to the 
question of exhaustion has been cited by many other circuits.101 
 
 96 Fry, 137 S Ct at 754 n 8. 
 97 98 F3d 989 (7th Cir 1996). 
 98 Id at 993. 
 99 Id at 990–91. 
 100 Id at 993. 
 101 See, for example, Polera v Board of Education of Newburgh Enlarged City School 
District, 288 F3d 478, 487 (2d Cir 2002) (“The opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in [Charlie F.] is particularly instructive.”). 
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The First,102 Second,103 Eighth,104 Tenth,105 and Eleventh106 
Circuits have also dealt squarely with the question and rejected 
the idea that the form of relief sought can control whether ex-
haustion is waived. At least one appellate court—the Eighth 
Circuit in J.M. v Francis Howell School District107—answered 
the question post-Fry and came to the same conclusion.108 
One common argument permeates these cases: if courts 
were to allow the form of relief to dictate whether the plaintiff 
must exhaust, they would create a roadmap for circumvention. 
Courts fear that parents simply will ask for money to evade a 
due process hearing or wait to file a complaint until they can 
argue that educational benefits would no longer address their 
child’s injury (because he has graduated, changed districts, or 
the like).109 
 
 102 See Frazier v Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F3d 52, 63 (1st Cir 2002) 
(“[Waiving exhaustion] would allow a plaintiff to bypass the administrative procedures 
merely by crafting her complaint to seek relief that educational authorities are powerless 
to grant.”). The First Circuit also compared the IDEA to the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA), Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1995), to justify mandating exhaustion. 
Frazier, 276 F3d at 61–62. For the reasons discussed in Part III.A.2, the comparison is 
not as apt as the court presents. Indeed, the PLRA informs a reading of § 1415(l) that 
waives exhaustion. 
 103 See Polera, 288 F3d at 487 (determining that plaintiffs are “not permitted to 
evade the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement merely by tacking on a request for money 
damages”). 
 104 See J.M. v Francis Howell School District, 850 F3d 944, 950 (8th Cir 2017) 
(noting that Fry declined to address the question, but nonetheless deciding that the fam-
ily was not exempt from exhaustion because they sought compensatory and punitive 
damages). 
 105 See Cudjoe v Independent School District No 12, 297 F3d 1058, 1066 (10th Cir 
2002) (“[T]he IDEA’s exhaustion requirement will not be excused simply because a 
plaintiff requests damages.”). 
 106 See N.B. v Alachua County School Board, 84 F3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir 1996) (per 
curiam) (adopting wholesale and verbatim in a one-sentence opinion the district court’s 
reasoning that “if the plaintiff ’s argument is to be accepted, then future litigants could 
avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative author-
ities could not grant”). 
 107 850 F3d 944 (8th Cir 2017). 
 108 Id at 950. 
 109 See, for example, Polera, 288 F3d at 490 (“[D]isabled-student plaintiffs . . . 
should not be permitted to ‘sit on’ live claims and spurn the administrative process that 
could provide the educational services they seek, then later sue for damages.”); Fraser v 
Tamalpais Union High School District, 281 Fed Appx 746, 747 (9th Cir 2008) (refusing 
to waive exhaustion for a then-graduated student whose injuries could have been re-
solved under the administrative process had they been timely raised). 
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B. The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit is an outlier in that it has relied on the 
plain-language reading of § 1415(l) to waive exhaustion. In W.B. 
v Matula,110 the plaintiff parents brought an action under 42 
USC § 1983, Rehabilitation Act § 504, and the IDEA, seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages for failure to provide a 
FAPE.111 According to W.B., the school failed to identify that her 
child, who had been diagnosed with ADHD, Tourette’s syn-
drome, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, needed special educa-
tion services.112 When the school finally acknowledged his dis-
ability, the district refused to give him an IEP because he was 
performing at or above grade level.113 W.B. engaged in several 
administrative proceedings—seeking an independent evalua-
tion, development of an IEP, a different disability classification, 
and attorney’s fees—which ended in a settlement between the 
school district and the family.114 
W.B. then sued, alleging a denial of a FAPE, an issue that 
the previous administrative hearings did not address. But this 
time, happy with her child’s current IEP and educational situa-
tion, she sought relief unavailable under the IDEA. The court re-
lied on a plain-language reading of § 1415(l), holding that “it 
would be futile, perhaps even impossible, for plaintiffs to ex-
haust their administrative remedies because the relief sought by 
plaintiffs in this action was unavailable in IDEA administrative 
proceedings.”115 The Third Circuit noted that “[w]here recourse 
to IDEA administrative proceedings would be futile or inade-
quate [ ] the exhaustion requirement is excused.”116 Matula has 
since been abrogated on other grounds.117 Nevertheless, this case 
stands for the proposition that the Third Circuit has waived ex-
haustion when the relief sought cannot be granted by an IHO. 
 
 110 67 F3d 484 (3d Cir 1995). 
 111 Id at 491. 
 112 Id at 488–89. 
 113 Id at 489. 
 114 Matula, 67 F3d at 489–90. 
 115 Id at 496. 
 116 Id at 495. Inadequacy, as opposed to futility, has generally been interpreted to 
refer to cases in which parents ask for structural, systematic reforms or challenge the 
adequacy of the administrative proceedings themselves. This exception would not be ap-
plicable here. For a discussion of the scope of the inadequacy exception in IDEA cases, 
see Hoeft, 967 F2d at 1309. 
 117 See A.W. v Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F3d 791, 792–93 (3d Cir 2007) (hold-
ing that a § 1983 action was not available to remedy IDEA-created rights, contrary to 
Matula). 
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Batchelor v Rose Tree Media School District118 threw the 
Third Circuit’s position into doubt. The case acknowledges that 
an exception for unavailable relief “exist[s] generally,” con-
sistent with Matula.119 Yet the court seemingly sides with the 
majority of circuits by finding the exception inapplicable “in the 
instant case.”120 The Third Circuit curiously gives no treatment 
to Matula while still acknowledging that the case remains good 
law by citing it for another principle.121 In ignoring that prece-
dent, Batchelor implicitly recharacterizes Matula in a manner 
inconsistent with its holding. By contrast, other courts inside 
and outside the Third Circuit agree with the proposition that 
Matula stands for the principle that, within the Third Circuit, 
the plain-language reading of § 1415(l) permits waiving exhaus-
tion when the form of relief is unavailable under the IDEA.122 
Because the reliance by other courts on Matula suggests that it 
is still good law, district courts in the Third Circuit grappling 
with the proper interpretation of § 1415(l) should rely on 
Matula. 
C. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the question, but its 
stance post-Fry is unclear. In Witte v Clark County School 
District,123 the court held that “under the plain words of the 
statute,” exhaustion is not required when money damages are 
sought.124 As in Matula, the Witte court relied on a plain-
language reading of the IDEA. Witte has not been explicitly 
overruled, but a subsequent case, Robb v Bethel School District 
# 403,125 distinguished Witte and unmoored the question of ex-
haustion from relief.126 Yet Robb was overruled by another case, 
Payne v Peninsula School District,127 that itself contributed to 
 
 118 759 F3d 266 (3d Cir 2014). 
 119 Id at 276. 
 120 See id at 276–78. 
 121 See id at 280. 
 122 See James S. v School District of Philadelphia, 559 F Supp 2d 600, 618 (ED Pa 
2008) (stating the holding of Matula and noting numerous district courts that had ap-
plied that holding). See also Abraham P. v Los Angeles Unified School District, 2017 WL 
4839071, *5 (CD Cal); Shadie v Forte, 2011 WL 607447, *5 (MD Pa); L.T. v Mansfield 
Township School District, 2007 WL 2332308, *7 (D NJ). 
 123 197 F3d 1271 (9th Cir 1999). 
 124 Id at 1275. 
 125 308 F3d 1047 (9th Cir 2002). 
 126 Id at 1049–50. 
 127 653 F3d 863 (9th Cir 2011) (en banc). 
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the circuit split resolved by Fry. To the extent that the case re-
mains good law, Payne suggests that the Ninth Circuit would 
permit the waiver of exhaustion in cases that allege a denial of a 
FAPE but seek a form of relief that the IDEA cannot provide. 
The facts of Witte are horrific: the plaintiff claimed that 
teachers at the defendant school had force-fed him oatmeal 
mixed with his own vomit, choked him when he failed to run fast 
enough, deprived him of meals, and threatened him with physi-
cal harm if he told his mother what was going on, among other 
violations.128 The fact that the educational concerns had been 
remedied factored into the court’s decision. The plaintiff had 
since changed schools and was receiving appropriate educational 
services at his new school, a change that had been “facilitated 
through the IEP process.”129 Although the parents had never in-
voked a formal due process hearing, the parents’ satisfaction 
with the student’s current educational state of affairs meant 
that remedies under the IDEA would be inappropriate for the 
harm. The court also noted that the nature of the injuries was 
not well suited to remedies under the IDEA.130 The court permit-
ted the suit to proceed without exhaustion.131 
The Ninth Circuit stepped back from this position in Robb 
and recharacterized Witte without explicitly overruling it. 
Money damages, according to the Robb court, were not doing the 
work in Witte.132 Rather, what mattered was that the parents 
had resolved the student’s educational issues informally and 
that the injuries were physical.133 
In Payne, the Ninth Circuit promulgated a “relief-centered” 
approach to determine when exhaustion was waived under 
§ 1415(l), explicitly overruling Robb.134 This decision diverged 
from the injury-centered approach of Charlie F. and its kin, 
wherein injuries that could be addressed to any degree by the 
due process hearing require exhaustion.135 Both approaches are 
moot post-Fry, which resolved this very disagreement. But the 
Payne court’s holding that the “exhaustion requirement applies 
to claims only to the extent that the relief actually sought by the 
 
 128 Witte, 197 F3d at 1272–73. 
 129 Id at 1273–74 & n 1. 
 130 Id at 1275–76. 
 131 Id at 1276. 
 132 Robb, 308 F3d at 1051. 
 133 Id at 1051–52. 
 134 Payne, 653 F3d at 874. 
 135 See Charlie F., 98 F3d at 993. 
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plaintiff could have been provided by the IDEA” and its affirma-
tion that Witte was consistent with § 1415(l) likely places the 
Ninth Circuit closer to the Third Circuit’s position.136 
Payne contains conflicting language about money damages 
specifically. The court wrote that “courts should start by look-
ing at a complaint’s prayer for relief and determine whether 
the relief sought is also available under the IDEA” and that it 
is improper “for courts to assume that money damages will be 
directed toward forms of relief that would be available under 
IDEA.”137 This language implies that the availability of the relief 
should be crucial to the analysis and that courts should not 
assume that IDEA relief will suffice in lieu of money damages. 
However, the court also asserted that exhaustion cannot be 
avoided “merely by limiting a prayer for relief to money dama-
ges.”138 The idea that money damages alone are not dispositive is 
not inconsistent with the waiver of exhaustion,139 but at least sug-
gests distancing the form of relief from the exhaustion analysis. In 
any event, the degree to which Payne is controlling in the Ninth 
Circuit is debatable post-Fry, for Fry rejected both the injury-
centered and relief-centered approaches. 
In sum, the Ninth Circuit is in a state of flux post-Fry, but 
given the stated reasoning in Witte and Payne, which are still—
at least in relevant part—good law in the Ninth Circuit, that 
court is likely open to holding that exhaustion may be waived in 
cases in which the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but seeks 
money damages. At least one district court in the Ninth Circuit 
has allowed a suit both alleging a denial of a FAPE and asking 
for money damages to move forward without exhaustion with 
respect to that form of relief, relying on both Fry and Payne to 
reach its conclusion.140 
 
 
 136 Payne, 653 F3d at 872, 874. See also Matula, 67 F3d at 495–96. 
 137 Payne, 653 F3d at 875, 877. This language, in part, responds to the Seventh 
Circuit’s assertion that, without first requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
judges cannot know whether parents are seeking money in lieu of another perfectly 
appropriate form of relief or whether money would truly be the right relief. Charlie F., 98 
F3d at 993. 
 138 Payne, 653 F3d at 877, quoting Robb, 308 F3d at 1049. 
 139 To be clear, this Comment does not advocate for a pleading standard. See 
Part III.C.5. 
 140 See A.M. v Fresno Unified School District, 2017 WL 6209389, *9–10 (ED Cal). 
See also Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071 at *5 (citing Matula, Payne, and Fry to suggest 
that exhaustion should be waived, but reaching its conclusion on other grounds). 
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D. Other Theories under Which Courts Have Waived 
Exhaustion: Past Injury, Physical Injury, and Common-
Law Torts 
There are some cases in which courts have waived exhaus-
tion for reasons seemingly unrelated to the plaintiff ’s prayer for 
a form of relief that the IDEA cannot provide. In those cases, 
courts insist that exhaustion was waived for some reason other 
than the request for money damages. Explanations include that 
the injury was entirely in the past, that the injury was wholly 
physical, or that the allegation amounted to a common-law tort. 
These cases are worth considering and reanalyzing in the 
wake of Fry. If a similar case were to be brought now, post-Fry, 
the court’s initial inquiry would have to be whether the plaintiff 
alleged a denial of a FAPE. There is an argument that each of 
these pre-Fry cases implicates a FAPE and thus would trigger 
exhaustion. And because Fry’s holding addressed how to deter-
mine when exhaustion applies generally, it presumably did not 
render irrelevant these carveouts.141 But if these cases rightly 
waived exhaustion, and this Comment argues they did, a new 
approach is needed to justify their results in the wake of Fry. 
Said differently, if similar cases were to arise again post-Fry, 
these precedents create tension with Fry’s gravamen-of-the-
complaint inquiry; this Comment’s solution resolves that tension. 
First, in Covington v Knox County School System,142 a school 
left a child in a time-out room for many hours at a time.143 The 
Sixth Circuit held that merely asking for money damages was 
not enough to waive exhaustion, but in “unique circumstances 
. . . in which the injured child has already graduated from the 
special education school, his injuries are wholly in the past, and 
therefore money damages are the only remedy that can make 
him whole,” families need not exhaust.144 Under very similar 
 
 141 For examples of courts applying the cases discussed in this Section post-Fry, see, 
for example, Crochran v Columbus City Schools, 278 F Supp 3d 1013, 1023 (SD Ohio 
2017) (permitting a suit to proceed without exhaustion), citing Covington v Knox County 
School System, 205 F3d 912 (6th Cir 2000); Carr v Department of Public Instruction, 
2018 WL 1033294, *6 (WD Wis), citing Padilla v School District No 1 in City and County 
of Denver, 233 F3d 1268 (10th Cir 2000). 
 142 205 F3d 912 (6th Cir 2000). 
 143 Id at 913. 
 144 Id at 917. It is worth noting that the Second Circuit rejected an exemption for 
similarly situated parents in Polera. 288 F3d at 489–90 (distinguishing Covington from 
Polera on the grounds that the plaintiffs in Polera could have obtained relief before the 
student graduated). 
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facts, in Padilla v School District No 1 in City and County of 
Denver,145 the Tenth Circuit held that exhaustion was waived, 
not because of the prayer for damages but because of the “severe 
physical, and completely non-educational, injuries” for which the 
plaintiff sought redress.146 
The explanations in both Covington and Padilla are incoher-
ent, especially post-Fry. Plenty of denials of FAPE are “wholly in 
the past,” as in Covington,147 for one reason or another, even for 
banal reasons like “the school year ended.”148 Moreover, pursu-
ant to the Fry inquiry, an injury that is entirely physical per the 
Padilla court could in fact be related to the denial of a FAPE. 
For instance, many IEPs include behavioral intervention plans 
that prescribe restraint procedures.149 If a school’s failure to 
properly implement those procedures resulted in physical injury, 
the nature of the injury nevertheless stemmed from the school’s 
failure to properly implement the IEP—a mistake that likely 
falls under the denial of a FAPE. In such a case, Fry may sug-
gest exhaustion when Covington or Padilla would not. 
Two cases illustrate that courts have waived exhaustion 
when they reason that the allegations amounted to state-law 
tort claims. In Muskrat v Deer Creek Public Schools,150 the 
Muskrats brought an action against their son’s school alleging 
several incidents of physical abuse by his teacher and aide as 
well as improper use of a time-out room.151 With regard to the 
allegations of battery, the court reasoned: “No authority holds 
that Congress meant to funnel isolated incidents of common law 
torts into the IDEA exhaustion regime.”152 Moore v Kansas City 
Public Schools153 held the same under an alarming set of facts. 
In that case, a young woman in a special education program in 
Missouri was raped at school while unsupervised.154 
The common-law-tort explanation falls short because it cre-
ates an arbitrary, perhaps even perverse, boundary. “[R]andom 
 
 145 233 F3d 1268 (10th Cir 2000). 
 146 Id at 1274. Although the court calls the injuries “non-educational,” this charac-
terization is questionable. The school acted in explicit contravention of her IEP, tying 
her injury closely to a FAPE. See id at 1271. 
 147 Covington, 205 F3d at 917. 
 148 Zdrowski v Rieck, 119 F Supp 3d 643, 668 (ED Mich 2015). 
 149 See 34 CFR § 300.530(f). 
 150 715 F3d 775 (10th Cir 2013). 
 151 Id at 780–81. 
 152 Id at 785. 
 153 828 F3d 687 (8th Cir 2016). 
 154 Id at 690. 
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violence”155 and “isolated incidents of common law torts”156 do not 
require exhaustion, and probably rightly. Yet by that logic, per-
vasive, repeated, nonrandom violence (which surely would still 
be a tort) related to or that stems from a child’s deficient educa-
tion plan would require extra procedural steps if a court applies 
the Fry standard. Unlike the “isolated” and “arbitrary” inci-
dents, in this latter set of cases, the child was denied a FAPE 
because of the injury’s educational nature. Applying Fry, then, 
in these cases, exhaustion would be required, and the plaintiffs 
would need to go through the due process hearing. So post-Fry, 
some torts indeed amount to a denial of a FAPE. Yet under 
these precedents, one class of torts proceeds straight to court, 
while FAPE-centric torts must hurdle an additional procedural 
step despite the qualitatively similar nature of the violation. 
Because of the unavailability of compensatory or punitive dam-
ages under the IDEA, the tortfeasor going through an adminis-
trative hearing would not pay via the appropriate form of relief 
through this process.157 If “isolated incidents” are properly reme-
died by compensatory or punitive damages that a court may dole 
out, why not (why not especially) nonrandom, FAPE-related 
incidents of the same kind? The answer to this question might 
be that the IDEA scheme incentivizes families to pursue admin-
istrative remedies while the harm is ongoing and redressable; 
true enough, but the exhaustion process will intentionally pre-
vent some (if not many) claims of ongoing, repeated FAPE-
related educational harm from making it to court. And since 
civil litigation is the only means by which the right form of relief 
to redress the harm can be allocated, there is little discernible 
difference between the claims in Moore and Muskrat and FAPE-
related claims of the same kind—if one agrees that both kinds of 
injuries are most properly redressed by relief that the IDEA 
cannot provide.158 The logic in Moore and Muskrat, then, is un-
tenable post-Fry. 
In each of the cases discussed in this Section, there is a 
strong intuition that the aggrieved party received the right relief 
for the injury incurred. Indeed, all of these cases have shocking 
facts. Applying traditional legal principles of relief, one might 
 
 155 Muskrat, 715 F3d at 785. 
 156 Id. 
 157 For more discussion of why damages are the appropriate relief for the injuries in 
cases like these, see Part III.C.1. 
 158 See Part III.C. 
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think that compensatory education or the like could not suffice 
to redress the wrong. Yet post-Fry, if the initial inquiry is 
whether the complaint alleges a denial of a FAPE, then these 
courts may well have reached a different result on the question 
of exhaustion. If the court’s starting point was whether the 
plaintiff was denied a FAPE, the answer would likely be yes in 
most, if not all, of these cases.159 Exhaustion would accordingly 
be required. Mandating exhaustion equates to a burdensome 
due process hearing; the hearing has benefits, to be sure, but 
one consequence is that exhaustion itself can effectively prevent 
cases from being litigated in court. In the aggregate, exhaustion 
reduces schools’ exposure to compensatory and punitive dama-
ges, even if theoretically such relief could be prescribed post-
hearing. Yet the nature of the injuries in these cases is such that 
the relief an IHO could provide is not sufficient redress for the 
wrong.160 Sometimes, then, requiring exhaustion effectively pre-
vents the appropriate form of relief from reaching the aggrieved 
party, which, this Comment concludes, leads to negative conse-
quences beyond just the affected student.161 
As such, exhaustion was rightly waived in these cases, but 
not because of the explanations proffered by the courts. Rather, 
a more cohesive, textually rooted distinction is needed to explain 
why waiving exhaustion was proper in these cases. This Comment 
suggests that the form of relief is that distinction. As the follow-
ing Part describes in detail, when the form of relief demanded is 
appropriate yet unavailable under the IDEA, exhaustion should 
be waived. This is consistent with the text of the IDEA (“seeking 
relief that is also available”)162 and leads to the right outcomes in 
each of the above cases. 
III.  INTERPRETING § 1415(L) TO WAIVE EXHAUSTION 
This Comment argues that when a plaintiff alleges a denial 
of a FAPE and appropriately demands relief unavailable under 
the IDEA, such as compensatory or punitive damages, exhaus-
tion should be waived. This argument is first and foremost 
 
 159 For further discussion of what constitutes a denial of a FAPE under Fry, see 
Part III.C.3. 
 160 For an explanation of when compensatory or punitive damages are appropriate 
for denials of a FAPE, see Parts III.C.1–2. 
 161 For a discussion of the inadequate deterrence this scheme would create, see 
Part III.C.4. 
 162 20 USC § 1415(l). 
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rooted in the statutory text of § 1415. Moreover, this conclusion is 
supported by language in Fry, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation 
Act, as well as the legislative history of the IDEA. 
Finally, this Comment argues that policy considerations, 
which courts often cite in this context, on balance support waiv-
ing exhaustion in the small set of cases considered here. In cases 
in which this question arises, the facts tend to be particularly 
disturbing because the injuries are of the kind for which damag-
es are the appropriate redress. At the same time, requiring ex-
haustion will necessarily prevent some, if not many, cases from 
being litigated in court—the only forum that can provide such 
relief. Yet these are the violations that should be deterred the 
most. As such, this Comment proposes that reading § 1415(l) to 
waive exhaustion when the complaint alleges a denial of a FAPE 
but damages are sought more adequately vindicates the rights of 
children with disabilities. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
As Justice Kagan wrote in Fry: “We begin, as always, with 
the statutory language at issue.”163 The text of § 1415(l) at issue 
here reads: 
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit 
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the 
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal 
laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, ex-
cept that before the filing of a civil action under such laws 
seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the 
procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted 
to the same extent as would be required had the action been 
brought under [the IDEA].164 
The pertinent phrase is “seeking relief that is also available.” If 
a plaintiff is “seeking relief” that is “available” under the IDEA, 
then exhaustion is mandated; otherwise, exhaustion is not re-
quired. From a cursory plain-language reading like that relied 
on by the Matula and Witte courts,165 it would seem that when 
relief is unavailable, as in the case in which the relief sought is 
 
 163 Fry, 137 S Ct at 753. 
 164 20 USC § 1415(l). 
 165 See Matula, 67 F3d at 496; Witte, 197 F3d at 1275. 
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something that the IDEA cannot provide, exhaustion is not re-
quired. Courts that do not allow relief to bear on exhaustion 
have given surprisingly short shrift to this intuitive reading of 
§ 1415(l). They have instead relied on policy arguments to justify 
exhaustion166 and characterized their conclusion as a “practical 
interpretation” of the statute rather than a textual one.167 These 
approaches, all but ignoring the plain-language reading, are in-
consistent with the tenets of statutory interpretation, which 
demand readings to be rooted in the text.168 
Although they are often used interchangeably, the use of 
“remedy” as opposed to “relief” in this context is important to a 
proper reading of § 1415(l). According to the edition of Black’s 
Law Dictionary that was current at the time § 1415(l) was add-
ed, remedy refers to “[t]he means by which . . . the violation of a 
right is prevented, redressed, or compensated.”169 Relief is de-
fined as “[d]eliverance from oppression, wrong, or injustice. In 
this sense it is used as a general designation of the assistance, 
redress, or benefit which a complainant seeks at the hand of 
court.”170 Under these definitions, then, remedy is the process; re-
lief is what the complainant asks for as a result of the process.171 
Comparing the language of the IDEA with other federal stat-
utes and regulations confirms this distinction. The Administrative 
Procedure Act172 (APA) includes similar language in relation to 
relief: “An action in a court of the United States seeking relief 
other than money damages . . . shall not be dismissed . . . .”173 
The phrase “other than money damages” informs the proper 
reading of the IDEA in two ways: first, it places money damages 
squarely in the category of relief, and second, it implicitly de-
fines relief as referring to the forms of redress that might be re-
quested. Several federal regulations use relief similarly.174 
 
 166 See, for example, Frazier, 276 F3d at 61. 
 167 Polera, 288 F3d at 488. 
 168 See Fry, 137 S Ct at 753. 
 169 Black’s Law Dictionary 1163 (West 5th ed 1979). 
 170 Id at 1161. 
 171 This distinction is certainly not unique to this Comment. See, for example, 1A 
California Jurisprudence § 3.71 at 122–23 (West 3d ed 2014) (stating that a remedy “is 
the means by which the action or corresponding obligation is effectuated” and relief “is 
the result obtained through the remedy”). 
 172 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified at 5 USC § 500 et seq. 
 173 5 USC § 702. 
 174 See, for example, 49 CFR § 1108.8(a)–(b) (“An arbitrator may grant relief in the 
form of monetary damages” but “[n]o injunctive relief shall be available.”); 48 CFR 
§ 1803.906(b)(2) (“The complainant may bring a de novo action at law or equity . . . to 
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Taken together, these laws and regulations demonstrate that 
federal rulemakers use relief in reference to those several forms 
of benefits or assistance that one might ask for in litigation. 
While this may seem obvious, Congress’s consistent use of relief 
in this sense shapes the proper reading of the IDEA. 
Despite this subtle but important distinction, relief and 
remedy are often conflated. But the conflation goes in only one 
direction. While “remedy” can be understood to refer to types of 
relief,175 the reverse is never true. That is, relief cannot be 
properly understood to refer to the process of obtaining re-
dress.176 And § 1415(l) refers to relief, not remedy. Even if the 
distinction does not seem compelling generally, the surrounding 
clauses make clear that “relief” in this particular statute must 
refer to forms of redress. The subsequent clause refers to “proce-
dures,” thereby implicitly distinguishing IDEA procedures from 
IDEA relief.177 The statute conditions exhaustion of one (proce-
dures) on the availability of the other (relief).178 From this, the 
proper reading of relief here cannot be process; it must refer to 
the various kinds of redress a complainant could receive from 
the process. In any event, even if Congress did not mean “relief” 
in the sense this Comment claims, courts are reluctant to correct 
“drafting errors.”179 Holding Congress to the meaning of the 
statute encourages precise word usage and removes the courts 
from acting as Congress’s interpreter.180 
With this interpretation of § 1415(l) as a backdrop, the fol-
lowing sections turn to other statutes and the Fry decision to 
lend support to this reading of the provision. 
 
seek compensatory damages and other relief available.”). See also FRCP 8(a)(3) (“A 
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a demand for the relief sought, 
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”). 
 175 Even footnote eight of the Fry opinion refers to “remedy.” Fry, 137 S Ct at 754 
n 8. The statute, though, refers to “relief.” And in the context of the IDEA, “remedies” is 
most frequently used in reference to “administrative remedies”—that is, the procedures, 
such as the due process hearing, generally mandated by § 1415(l). See, for example, id 
at 757. 
 176 The APA and federal rules and regulations cited above confirm this. Even if 
Congress is not consistent with respect to “remedy,” “relief ”  is used only with the conno-
tation of various forms. See text accompanying notes 172–74. 
 177 20 USC § 1415(l). 
 178 20 USC § 1415(l). 
 179 See Lamie v United States Trustee, 540 US 526, 542 (2004) (explaining that it is 
beyond the province of the courts to correct Congress’s drafting mistakes). 
 180 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 381–82 (2005). 
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1. The ADA, § 504, and Fry. 
Fry resolved a circuit split181 over when exhaustion was 
mandated for suits brought under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act 
§ 504, but, of course, left this Comment’s subject open. Turning 
to the language of those statutes and then to the Fry decision it-
self nonetheless guides the proper interpretation of § 1415(l). 
Before Fry was decided, some argued that the proper resolu-
tion of the circuit split that Fry settled was that students who 
were double-covered by the ADA or § 504 and the IDEA who 
brought a claim based solely on the ADA or § 504 should not 
have to exhaust.182 This argument was rooted in the differences 
between “the procedures and substantive requirements for the 
identification, evaluation, educational placement, and FAPE for 
students” under the IDEA, as compared to its sister statutes.183 
Of course, the relief available under these statutes is also differ-
ent. These statutory differences did not play a role in the Fry de-
cision,184 but the reasoning still bears on this question. At the 
very least, statutory differences indicate that caution is war-
ranted before uniformly mandating exhaustion without regard 
to the individual underlying facts. 
Turning to Fry, although the Court did not explicitly answer 
this question, the reasoning of the case nonetheless supports 
this Comment’s conclusion. Language in Fry implies that ex-
haustion is contingent on what an IHO can provide. The Court 
reasoned that exhaustion would be waived if “[a] hearing officer 
. . . would have to send [a plaintiff] away empty-handed.”185 And 
an IHO would certainly have to turn a parent away empty 
handed if that parent requested the kinds of relief that an IHO 
 
 181 Compare generally Payne, 653 F3d 863, with Charlie F., 98 F3d 989. 
 182 See generally Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misin-
terpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Cov-
ered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 Conn 
L Rev 259 (2011). 
 183 Id at 286. 
 184 The Frys did not include arguments about ADA or § 504 remedies in their brief, 
but some amici did. See, for example, Brief Amicus Curiae for the Council of Parent 
Attorneys and Advocates and Advocates for Children of New York in Support of Petition-
ers, Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, Docket No 15-497, *9–15 (US filed Aug 29, 
2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4547900) (arguing that the differences between 
the ADA, § 504, and the IDEA—particularly Congress’s choice not to impose an exhaus-
tion requirement for the ADA and § 504—supported waiver). 
 185 Fry, 137 S Ct at 754. 
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was not able to give.186 The Fry Court recognized, then, that the 
limits of an IHO’s authority interplay with the proper reading of 
what “relief” is “available.” 
Such a reading is not in tension with the core holding in Fry 
that the only category of “relief” the IDEA makes “available” is 
relief for the denial of a FAPE. That holding describes only what 
an IHO can give relief for, but an IHO is also constrained by the 
form that relief will take. The Court also characterized its hold-
ing as “establish[ing] the scope of § 1415(l)” by identifying “the 
circumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain re-
dress (or, similarly, to access a benefit).”187 If relief for a denial of 
a FAPE represents one dimension of that scope, then the kinds 
of relief available represent another dimension. Both define the 
circumstances in which a parent can access the appropriate re-
dress for the injury of a disabled child, and both can be baked 
into the statutory language of “relief that is also available.” To 
ignore the availability of a form of relief, the plainest reading of 
the statute, is to contort the IDEA in a way that is inconsistent 
with the principles of statutory interpretation. 
Because Fry left footnotes four and eight open for debate, 
courts answering this question must turn once again to inter-
preting § 1415(l). Properly interpreting the IDEA hinges on 
reading relief as taking a certain form: for example, relief in the 
form of damages or relief in the form of an injunction. Courts 
reading § 1415(l), however, have often ignored the form of relief 
and focused only on what relief is for. For example, in Charlie F., 
the Seventh Circuit read the statute to mean “relief for the 
events, condition, or consequences of which the person com-
plains.”188 This is an unnatural reading of “seeking relief that is 
also available.” As Fry explained, what the relief is for is only 
part of the picture; it is the scope of the relief, but not the re-
lief itself.189 For the statute refers directly to “relief,” and the 
 
 186 As noted in footnote four of Fry, the solicitor general also agrees with this plain-
language interpretation. Id at 752 n 4. The amicus brief argued for a holding in Fry that 
exempted the Frys from the exhaustion requirement because of their prayer for compen-
satory damages. Solicitor General Brief at *16 (cited in note 95). Of course, that was not 
the outcome, but the argument still bears on this question. 
 187 Fry, 137 S Ct at 753. 
 188 Charlie F., 98 F3d at 992. Other courts on this side of the split reasoned similarly. 
See, for example, Cudjoe, 297 F3d at 1067 (“The IDEA offers redress whose ‘genesis and 
manifestation . . . are educational.’”), quoting Charlie F., 98 F3d at 993. 
 189 See Fry, 137 S Ct at 753–54. 
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plainest reading of § 1415(l) focuses on the form of relief being 
sought. 
The Charlie F. court reasoned that if the administrative 
process could provide some relief, it should be exhausted.190 And 
though Fry rejected that inquiry for exhaustion generally, it 
would still be relevant in a case in which the relief sought was 
unavailable under the IDEA. Presumably courts that follow the 
Charlie F. approach would apply their in-circuit precedent for 
approaching the question of exhaustion after concluding that the 
plaintiff alleged a denial of a FAPE under Fry. Indeed, this was 
the Eighth Circuit’s approach in J.M., the only post-Fry case to 
confront this question. 
As J.M. demonstrates, though, reconciling Fry with the rea-
soning of the circuits on the Charlie F. side of the split would re-
sult in a catch-22 for plaintiffs. In J.M., the court acknowledged 
that Fry left this question open, but maintained that asking for 
relief that the IDEA cannot provide does not waive exhaus-
tion.191 In the court’s view, that the parent had voluntarily 
removed the student from school, removing compensatory edu-
cation as a viable option, did not “exempt her from the exhaus-
tion requirement.”192 Facially, this seems sensible; plaintiffs 
should not manufacture situations to obtain a certain form of re-
lief. But if parents need to pull their students from school for 
legitimate reasons,193 they cannot immediately file a civil suit 
under J.M., nor will any relief that an IHO can give be effective, 
because the child is no longer in school to receive compensatory 
education. The result is that the parent must keep the child in 
the problematic educational placement if they want any relief 
at all. 
This particular result stems from the facts of J.M. but rep-
resents the incongruence of Fry with J.M. and its ilk. Courts 
that would not permit exhaustion for denials of a FAPE when 
unavailable relief is the appropriate relief create a situation in 
which the plaintiff must settle for relief that does not actually 
redress her injury or get no relief at all. This status quo is in 
 
 190 Charlie F., 98 F3d at 992. 
 191 J.M., 850 F3d at 950 (“[T]he IDEA’s exhaustion requirement remains the general 
rule, regardless of whether the administrative process offers the particular type of relief 
that is being sought.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Legitimate reasons might include safety concerns. As Part III.C.2 discusses, vio-
lations of the sort in which damages are the appropriate remedy often involve physical 
injuries, as the facts of Abraham P. illustrate. See note 1 and accompanying text. 
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tension with Fry’s reasoning that exhaustion should not be 
mandated when an IHO “would have to send [a plaintiff] away 
empty-handed.”194 
2. Distinguishing the IDEA and relief from the PLRA and 
remedy. 
The IDEA stands in contrast with the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act195 (PLRA). Courts’ interpretations of the PLRA can 
help inform the terms of the IDEA exhaustion requirement be-
cause the language of the statutes are facially similar. But 
courts have generally read the PLRA to almost always mandate 
exhaustion, and as such, courts sometimes invoke the PLRA to 
defend exhaustion under the IDEA.196 The exhaustion clause of 
the IDEA, however, can be distinguished from the PLRA based 
on its precise word choice and construction. Indeed, the PLRA’s 
language confirms that Congress could have required exhaus-
tion under the IDEA without concern for the availability of the 
relief sought, but chose not to in § 1415(l). 
The PLRA contains language unequivocally mandating ex-
haustion: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison con-
ditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, 
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”197 The language of the PLRA is clearly stronger than 
the IDEA’s § 1415(l). While the PLRA in 41 USC § 1997e creates 
an affirmative mandate to exhaust, the IDEA is written condi-
tionally: prisoners must first go through the administrative pro-
cesses, whereas students need exhaust only if relief is available. 
This distinction, while admittedly formalistic, implies a level of 
flexibility baked into the IDEA. 
Beyond this formal distinction, case law surrounding the 
last clause of 42 USC § 1997e(a)—“until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted”—aids in the proper 
interpretation of the IDEA’s similar use of “available.” In Ross v 
Blake,198 the Court reiterated that “available” means “‘capable of 
use for the accomplishment of a purpose,’ and that which ‘is 
 
 194 Fry, 137 S Ct at 754. 
 195 Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321-066 (1996), codified as amended at 18 USC § 3626. 
 196 See, for example, Frazier, 276 F3d at 61–62 (analogizing PLRA exhaustion to 
IDEA exhaustion). 
 197 42 USC § 1997e(a). 
 198 136 S Ct 1850 (2016). 
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accessible or may be obtained.’”199 The Court elaborated that 
unavailability includes a situation in which pursuing the admin-
istrative process would be a “dead end” because officers are unable 
to provide the requested relief.200 This analysis maps nicely onto 
the IDEA. For parents seeking monetary relief, pursuing a due 
process hearing, wherein IHOs simply cannot grant the relief 
they seek, would be a dead end—and thus relief is by definition 
unavailable. 
But some cases have cited another PLRA case, Booth v 
Churner,201 which mandated stringent restrictions on waiving 
exhaustion, to justify a reading of the IDEA that mandates ex-
haustion even when the requested relief is unavailable.202 Booth, 
like Ross, interpreted the exhaustion language in the PLRA: 
“until such administrative remedies as are available are ex-
hausted.”203 In that case, the plaintiff requested money damages, 
which were not available in the administrative process. The 
court held that the availability of the relief sought was not rele-
vant. Exhaustion was required notwithstanding the availability 
of compensatory damages or other types of relief. While this 
holding may seem to preclude an exception to IDEA exhaustion 
for compensatory relief, the PLRA and its reading in Booth are 
distinguishable from the IDEA in essential ways. 
Crucially, the PLRA refers to “remedy,” not “relief.” Again, 
remedy here should be understood to refer to the process; relief 
refers to the redress that comes from that process.204 The differ-
ence is subtle but important, and the construction of the PLRA 
confirms the distinction. The precursor to the PLRA, the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act205 (CRIPA), required ex-
haustion only if a “plain, speedy, and effective” remedy was 
available.206 “Plain” and “speedy” are descriptors of a process, not 
of a form of assistance. Moreover, Ross implicitly confirms this 
difference by referring to the prison grievance process itself as 
the “available remed[y]” in question—as opposed to the money 
or institutional change that the plaintiff hoped to get out of the 
 
 199 Id at 1858–59, quoting Booth v Churner, 532 US 731, 737–38 (2001). 
 200 Ross, 136 S Ct at 1859. 
 201 532 US 731 (2001). 
 202 See, for example, Frazier, 276 F3d at 61–62. 
 203 42 USC § 1997e(a). 
 204 See text accompanying notes 163–80. 
 205 Pub L No 96-247, 94 Stat 349 (1980). 
 206 CRIPA § 7(a)(1), 94 Stat at 352. 
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process.207 Remedy, then, is understood to refer to the “mecha-
nism [ ] to provide relief” as distinct from the relief itself.208 
Other case law supports this distinction, and, by extension, a 
definition of relief grounded in the type or form of redress 
sought, as opposed to the process or what the relief is for.209 
Booth, then, is not only reconcilable with this Comment’s 
reading of § 1415(l) but demonstrates that precise word choice 
can guide statutory interpretation. The logic of Booth’s holding 
rested on reading the statute as mandating exhaustion of the 
available procedures. This reading was supported by the construc-
tion of the sentence (the verb “exhausted” modified “remedy”) and 
by the dictionary definitions.210 Applied to the IDEA, the remedies 
available would include the due process hearing as established 
by state education agencies. If the statute were phrased like the 
PLRA, a parent would have to engage with state procedures if 
the state provided an infrastructure for a due process hearing; 
the only applicable exceptions would be those laid out in Ross. 
But the statute is not phrased as such. The term “exhausted” 
does not modify “relief,” it modifies “procedures”; “available” 
modifies “relief.” And the relief available under the IDEA’s pro-
cedures is a different matter entirely from the procedures avail-
able; compensatory damages are decidedly not included in the 
former category. The PLRA demonstrates that Congress can and 
does deploy language creating an unequivocal exhaustion man-
date. Congress did not do so in § 1415(l), instead linking exhaus-
tion to the relief sought. 
B. Legislative History 
Not only is the conclusion that exhaustion should be waived 
when the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but seeks unavail-
able relief firmly rooted in the statutory text, it is consistent 
 
 207 See Ross, 136 S Ct at 1858–60 (quotation marks omitted). 
 208 Id at 1859. Even if one uses “remedy” as synonymous with “relief,” which, as 
noted in this Comment and in Booth, is not uncommon, the opposite is not acceptable. As 
explained in Part III.A, “relief ” is not used to refer to procedure in the same way that 
“remedy” might be used to refer to the kinds of redress sought. Moreover, as this para-
graph describes, the context of “remedy” in the PLRA makes clear that it is not synony-
mous with “relief ” in the IDEA. 
 209 See Coleman v Wilson, 933 F Supp 954, 957 (ED Cal 1996) (explaining that the 
definition of relief “focus[es] on the ultimate legal form of remedy rather than the means 
of achieving the remedy”). See also Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v Sheriff of Suffolk 
County, 952 F Supp 869, 879 (D Mass 1997) (“Relief is thus defined as a type of remedy.”). 
 210 See Booth, 532 US at 738–39. 
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with the purpose of the IDEA. In hearings for the EHA, Senator 
Harrison Williams emphasized that exhaustion was not an un-
equivocal mandate: “I want to underscore that exhaustion of the 
administrative procedures established under this part should 
not be required for any individual complainant filing a judicial 
action in cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as a 
legal or practical matter.”211 Allowing relief in the form of dam-
ages in these cases promotes the goal of accountability as the 
lawmakers who passed EHA intended and, moreover, consti-
tutes a case in which futility would be practically and legally 
futile. 
A decade later, Congress explicitly enacted § 1415(l) as a 
direct response to Smith.212 The legislative history of that 
amendment also points to this exception to the exhaustion rules. 
Representative George Miller, one of the original coauthors of 
the EHA, stated at the time that “there are certain situations in 
which it is not appropriate to require the exhaustion of EHA 
remedies before filing a civil law suit,” including when “the hear-
ing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought.”213 Note 
that Miller implicitly distinguished between relief and remedy 
here, consistent with the discussion in Part III.A.1. He then 
noted that “[t]oday’s bill addresses all of these concerns,” imply-
ing that § 1415(l) as written encapsulates those exceptions.214 
Taken together, these pieces of legislative history from the 
EHA’s original enactment and the passage of § 1415(l) support 
an exemption for plaintiffs alleging a denial of a FAPE but re-
questing damages. There are no indications that Congress in-
tended courts to deviate from the plain-language reading of the 
statute (the interpretation utilized by the Matula court), and in-
deed, there is evidence from Miller’s statements that Congress 
very much intended for the prayer for relief to have at least 
some controlling effect on the propriety of exhaustion.215 
 
 211 S 6, 94th Cong, 1st Sess, in 121 Cong Rec 37416 (Nov 19, 1975). 
 212 HR 1523, 99th Cong, 1st Sess, in 131 Cong Rec 31376 (Nov 12, 1985) (“We all 
want to see the decision in Smith versus Robinson overturned.”). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id at 31377. 
 215 Some disfavor legislative history as a tool of construction. See, for example, 
District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 589–90 & n 12 (rejecting the dissent’s legislative-
history-based interpretation of the Second Amendment); Lawson v FMR, 134 S Ct 1158, 
1176–77 (2014) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e are a 
government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than 
by what it intended.”). See also Nelson, 91 Va L Rev at 362 (cited in note 180). But it still 
lends support to the reading of the statute, at least corroborating the textualist approach 
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C. Policy 
As a matter of policy, exhaustion should be waived in the 
set of cases in which money damages are the appropriate form of 
relief but the complaint nevertheless alleges a denial of a FAPE. 
First, an analysis of the gravamen-of-the-complaint standard 
established by Fry is warranted in order to understand the cir-
cumstances that will give rise to such a case. Such cases are un-
common, as this Section explains, yet when they arise, the facts 
are such that justice is not served by mere IDEA relief. The 
analysis unfolds in three Sections: First, Part III.C.1 addresses 
when non-IDEA relief is appropriate by applying long-standing 
legal principles of relief. Next, Part III.C.2 applies the Fry 
standard to unpack when a set of facts alleges a denial of a 
FAPE. Part III.C.3 then synthesizes the first two Sections by 
discussing when a complaint both alleges a denial of a FAPE 
and when the injury calls for compensatory or punitive damages; 
these are the cases in which this Section’s question arises. 
Finally, this Comment concludes by discussing the policy 
implications for waiving exhaustion in this set of cases. 
Part III.C.4 addresses the deterrence value of waiving exhaus-
tion in these cases, while Part III.C.5 confronts the merits of the 
due process hearing. 
1. When non-IDEA relief would be appropriate. 
Cases in which compensatory damages are appropriate relief, 
rather than compensatory education, tuition repayment, or in-
junctive relief, involve harm beyond the typical denial of a 
FAPE. In IDEA cases, as in all civil litigation, courts are con-
cerned with granting relief that will appropriately redress the 
violation.216 In most cases, supplemental services or other typical 
IDEA remedies that an IHO is empowered to give will suffi-
ciently redress the injury. If a school fails to provide the correct 
IEP-mandated accommodations in, say, math class, the result-
ing lack of appropriate progress is remediable by additional 
compensatory education services. If the parent unilaterally 
 
of Part III.A. See Digital Reality Trust v Somers, 138 S Ct 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor 
concurring) (“Legislative history is of course not the law, but that does not mean it 
cannot aid us in our understanding of a law.”). 
 216 D.F. v Collingswood Borough Board of Education, 694 F3d 488, 498–99 (3d Cir 
2012) (“In each case, a court will evaluate the specific type of relief that is appropriate to 
ensure that a student is fully compensated for a school district’s past violations of his or 
her rights under the IDEA.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
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transfers the child to a private school because of a deficient 
public-school program, tuition reimbursement suits the injury 
well. Thus, the injury needs to be above and beyond the typical 
for this question to arise. 
This assertion is rooted in the well-established legal princi-
ple that the purpose of relief for a wrong is to make the plaintiff 
whole, and compensatory damages in particular are well suited 
for injuries for which the plaintiff has suffered pain or emotional 
distress.217 These are attendant results of all denials of a FAPE 
to some extent, but in most cases, the plaintiff can be made more 
or less whole through forms of IDEA relief that redress educa-
tional injuries.218 Sometimes, though, the physical or mental 
pain, suffering, and emotional distress of the FAPE denial are 
more than de minimis, so much so as to justify compensatory 
damages.219 Part II.D demonstrates that such cases exist, and 
courts have carved out exceptions that effectively allow for com-
pensatory damages by waiving exhaustion. But as that Section 
discussed, those cases create tension with Fry. 
The law of punitive damages similarly limits their applica-
tion to a particular class of cases: they are appropriate only 
when the offending conduct rises far beyond the acceptable.220 
 
 217 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903, comment a (1965): 
[Compensatory damages] give to the injured person some pecuniary return for 
what he has suffered or is likely to suffer. There is no scale by which the det-
riment caused by suffering can be measured and hence there can be only a very 
rough correspondence between the amount awarded as damages and the extent 
of the suffering. 
See also, for example, Albemarle Paper Company v Moody, 422 US 405, 418 (1975) (ex-
plaining that relief for employment discrimination claims should “make the person[ ] 
whole for injuries suffered”). 
 218 See Burlington, 471 US at 370–71 (concluding that tuition repayment is appro-
priate relief for some IDEA claims because it requires schools “to belatedly pay expenses 
that [they] should have paid all along”); Boose, 786 F3d at 1056 (describing compensa-
tory education’s role as making up for past deficiencies in a child’s educational program 
and undoing damage done by prior violations). 
 219 See Sellers v School Board of the City of Manassas, 141 F3d 524, 527 (4th Cir 
1998) (suggesting that compensatory and punitive damages under the IDEA would 
amount to relief for “pain and suffering, emotional distress, and other consequential 
damages caused by” the denial of a FAPE). While Sellers denied that this kind of relief 
was available under the IDEA, compensatory and punitive damages are available under 
the IDEA’s sister statutes and the Constitution. The court’s language is instructive as to 
when such relief is appropriate: when the injury at issue prompts pain, suffering, and 
emotional distress. 
 220 See Exxon Shipping Co v Baker, 554 US 471, 491–95 (2008) (discussing the histori-
cal justifications for punitive damages and modern standards for the degree of culpabil-
ity required for their award). 
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Awards of punitive damages seek to deter particularly harmful 
and blameworthy conduct in addition to their retributive func-
tion.221 Determining when to award punitive damages, then, is 
in some ways easier than determining when to award compensa-
tory damages because the conduct at issue must be particularly 
egregious.222 
Based on these legal principles, the injury must implicate 
more than educational benefits for compensatory and punitive 
damages—both of which are unavailable under the IDEA—to be 
the appropriate form of relief for a denial of a FAPE. The injury 
must result in material distress, physical or emotional, or result 
from the conduct of highly culpable actors. 
2. Allegations of a denial of a FAPE under Fry. 
In addition to alleging a pattern of facts for which the un-
available relief is appropriate, under Fry, the complaint must 
substantively allege a denial of a FAPE. In Fry, Justice Kagan 
offers several “clues” for determining whether the gravamen of 
the complaint alleges a denial of a FAPE.223 First, could the 
plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if it occurred 
in a different public space—“say, a public theater or library?”224 
Along the same lines, could an adult at the school have brought 
the same claim?225 Although these questions are merely guide-
posts, if the answer to both of these questions is “yes,” then the 
claim likely does not allege a denial of a FAPE.226 As discussed 
in Part I.C, in Fry, these questions applied neatly to the facts at 
hand: had E.F. been denied entry to a library with her golden-
doodle, Wonder, or had a teacher in the school been denied entry, 
 
 221 Id. For a recent brief overview of when courts find that punitive damages are 
appropriate, see Roseanna Summers, Comment, The Psychology of Punishment and the 
Puzzle of Why Tortfeasor Death Defeats Liability for Punitive Damages, 124 Yale L J 
1295, 1295 (2015) (“[Punitive damages serve] two main purposes: (1) punishing outra-
geous conduct and (2) deterring its future occurrence.”). 
 222 Under state law, states differ as to the precise standard required to justify puni-
tive damages. But all agree that it is some heightened level of culpability. See, for exam-
ple, Peterson v Travelers Indemnity Co, 867 F3d 992, 995 (8th Cir 2017) (“South Dakota 
allows punitive damages if malice exists.”); Parker v Four Seasons Hotel, Ltd, 845 F3d 
807, 812–13 (7th Cir 2017) (explaining that Illinois law distinguishes between mere neg-
ligent behavior and fraudulent, malicious, or violent behavior for purposes of awarding 
punitive damages). 
 223 Fry, 137 S Ct at 756. 
 224 Id. 
 225 See id. 
 226 See id. 
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a discrimination claim would be equally available. And these 
questions might well prove useful when, as in Fry, an element of 
physical access is the problem. They prove less straightforward 
under other sets of facts. 
Not many lower courts have grappled with applying these 
questions to other fact patterns as of yet. But cases that have 
done so make it evident that the utility of the suggested inquir-
ies decreases as the injuries become more uniquely school re-
lated.227 It can be difficult for courts to determine whether a 
child’s injury would be cognizable had it occurred in another 
public sphere because public officials outside of the school set-
ting do not possess the same level of close relation with, respon-
sibility for, and knowledge of children with disabilities. More-
over, when cases allege a denial of a FAPE, the injury must be 
related to the educational benefits to which students are enti-
tled.228 An injury implicating the student’s IEP (an educational 
benefit to which the student is entitled) at least suggests a den-
ial of a FAPE, yet the questions Fry leaves lower courts to work 
with might point the other way. Disentangling the injury from 
the educational setting, then, can yield conflicting, even irra-
tional, results.229 
If past cases that waived exhaustion were to come out the 
same way post-Fry, those plaintiffs could not allege a FAPE de-
nial. But analysis of the facts of these cases shows that a FAPE 
is likely implicated. For instance, applying the “clues” to the 
facts of Witte,230 could the plaintiff have brought the same case if 
he had been force-fed oatmeal by a librarian in a public library? 
 
 227 See, for example, J.S., III v Houston County Board of Education, 877 F3d 979, 
986 (11th Cir 2017) (explaining that the cause of action in question “does not fit neatly 
into Fry’s hypotheticals” and could conceivably fit under both a denial of a FAPE and 
intentional discrimination under the ADA). See also Fry, 137 S Ct at 759 (Alito concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (cautioning against the use of the majority’s 
clues because of the overlap between the relief available under the IDEA, the ADA, 
and § 504). 
 228 See Endrew F., 137 S Ct at 996–97, citing Rowley, 458 US at 207. 
 229 For an illustration of this tension in post-Fry cases, compare Abraham P. v Los 
Angeles Unified School District, 2017 WL 4839071, *4 (CD Cal) (determining that the 
plaintiff was not alleging a denial of a FAPE because he claimed he was placed in a seg-
regated setting at school, and he “could theoretically raise a similar argument if he was 
placed in a segregated setting at a theater”), with Parrish v Bentonville School District, 
2017 WL 1086198, *30 (WD Ark) (conceding that a plaintiff could be “segregated” in a 
public space like a library or theater and have a cognizable claim, but because the segre-
gation occurred in a special education classroom, a uniquely educational feature, the al-
legation amounted to a denial of a FAPE). 
 230 See text accompanying notes 123–31. 
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Yes; but librarians, unlike teachers and school administrators, 
are not responsible for discipline or for overseeing a mealtime—
such a situation would simply never arise. Similarly, could a 
teacher have brought the same claim as the child in Witte? 
Again, yes; but it would be absurd to imagine a principal repri-
manding an adult teacher by demanding that she eat oatmeal. 
Just asking the suggested questions here feels bizarre given 
that these facts would not arise elsewhere; yet this is what Fry 
left lower courts to work with.231 Because this example comes 
from a real case, a similar fact pattern could reoccur. Courts 
would have to confront facts like these in the wake of Fry no 
matter how far removed they seem from the paradigmatic ex-
amples posed in that case.232 And it seems overly formalistic to 
assert that these claims are unrelated to a FAPE simply be-
cause, in some alternate universe in which librarians and thea-
ter tellers are responsible for the well-being of a child for eight 
hours (or more) a day, they could have occurred in another pub-
lic sphere. Ultimately, these facts simply would never happen 
but for school faculty’s and staff ’s unique positions in the child’s 
life—as disciplinarians, protectors, educators, counselors, and 
monitors. 
Covington provides another example of a case in which try-
ing to reconcile the result of the case (waiver of exhaustion) with 
the Fry standard (whether the plaintiffs alleged a denial of a 
FAPE) proves incongruous. In that case, Jason Covington, a 
child with mental and emotional disabilities, was disciplined by 
his teacher in the form of a “vault-like” time-out room.233 Jason 
was locked in the time-out room for long stretches of time 
and, on one occasion, had to relieve himself on the floor.234 The 
 
 231 One post-Fry case applied these questions to a case concerning a student’s toilet-
ing needs, demonstrating the bizarreness that some relatively common educational sce-
narios yield when applied to other public facilities or to comparably situated adults. 
Sophie G. v Wilson County Schools, 265 F Supp 3d 765, 771 (MD Tenn 2017). 
 232 The Court used two examples. First, it cited a wheelchair-bound student seeking 
access to the building; then, it compared that to a child alleging that the school failed to 
provide remedial math tutoring. The former example did not allege a denial of a FAPE; 
the latter did. Fry, 137 S Ct at 756–57. Clearly Witte, see text accompanying notes 123–
31, and Covington, see text accompanying notes 142–46, 233–36, do not map nicely onto 
either set of facts, but they are also not fanciful or fictional. Courts determining whether 
students under similar scenarios alleged a denial of a FAPE face a challenge, then, 
applying Fry to scenarios in which the injury intertwines with the student’s educa-
tional plan. 
 233 Covington, 205 F3d at 913. 
 234 Id at 913–14. 
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time-out room was a form of discipline contemplated by Jason’s 
IEP, although obviously not as implemented.235 The Sixth Circuit 
waived exhaustion but only because Jason had since graduated; 
the court reasoned that the harm was entirely retrospective and 
thus exhaustion was unnecessary.236 
Now, applying the questions from Fry, what if Jason had 
been segregated in a similar fashion in a public theater? Would 
an adult in the building likewise have a claim? The answer to 
both must be yes. But like Witte, such a situation would never 
arise because theater attendants do not discipline patrons, nor 
do adults go to time-out. The uniquely educational nature of the 
injury must weigh toward the conclusion that Jason was denied 
a FAPE. And under Fry, that would indicate that exhaustion is 
mandated; yet the court pre-Fry waived exhaustion.237 
This discussion goes to show that recharacterizing cases like 
Covington and Witte as non-FAPE cases based on the questions 
posed by Fry in order to reconcile their results—that is, that ex-
haustion was waived—is not tenable. That kind of characteriza-
tion divorces the events from their uniquely educational con-
text.238 Grappling with what constitutes a denial of a FAPE 
under the Fry standard thereby reveals the ambiguities of the 
Fry standard. Witte and Covington do, at least arguably, allege a 
denial of a FAPE, which post-Fry would trigger exhaustion, a 
different result than those courts reached. The following Section 
argues that these cases are the kind in which damages were the 
correct, appropriate relief, and as such, both cases properly 
waived exhaustion when they were decided. Fry might seem to 
compel another result today, but because it left open the ques-
tion, another solution—the interpretation of § 1415(l) proposed 
by this Comment—is possible. 
 
 
 
 235 Id at 914. 
 236 Id at 917. 
 237 Courts have come out differently post-Fry on this very issue (segregation), in-
cluding in young Abraham’s case. See Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071 at *4 (determining 
that the plaintiff was not alleging a denial of FAPE because he claimed he was placed in 
a segregated setting at school, and he “could theoretically raise a similar argument if he 
was placed in a segregated setting at a theater”). 
 238 In any event, the cases at issue here are few and far between. The infrequency of 
such cases alone should go a long way to quell the fears of critics that this would create a 
pleading standard by which parents could circumvent exhaustion. 
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3. The most egregious violations: cases in which 
compensatory damages are appropriate and a denial of a 
FAPE is alleged. 
Parts III.C.1–2 show that in order for the question at the 
heart of this Comment to arise, three conditions must be satis-
fied: the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE, the plaintiff seeks a 
prayer for relief unavailable under the IDEA, and, crucially, the 
desired relief must be the appropriate relief. The last condition 
is relatively rare in FAPE cases. Damages are appropriate only 
for the kinds of injuries that go beyond typical educational 
wrongs, such as injuries involving physical harm or severe emo-
tional distress.239 But though they are rare, past cases such as 
Covington and Witte demonstrate that these kinds of facts do 
exist. 
Turning back once more to Covington, assume that Jason 
had not graduated at the time of the lawsuit and that he was 
still a public-school student with the other underlying facts re-
maining the same. As to the question of relief, compensatory ed-
ucation under the IDEA can help compensate Jason for the lost 
learning time and maybe even help get him therapeutic services 
going forward; an injunction under the IDEA might prevent the 
misuse of the time-out room as applied to other students in the 
future, but can any form of relief available under the IDEA com-
pensate for the emotional distress and physical and psychologi-
cal trauma caused by Jason’s time in a small, dark room? In-
deed, traditional doctrine tells us that compensatory damages 
are the proper relief for such an injury,240 and such relief is un-
available under the IDEA.241 But because he has at least argua-
bly alleged a denial of a FAPE,242 Fry would first compel the 
“ponderous” exhaustion process through a forum that cannot 
provide the appropriate relief.243 
A potentially interesting and increasingly relevant set of 
cases in which this might arise involves in-school arrests. When 
a teacher calls the police for behavior that is a manifestation of a 
 
 239 See Part III.C.1. E.F. and her family sought damages for emotional distress in 
Fry itself. See Fry, 137 S Ct at 752. 
 240 See, for example, Witte, 197 F3d at 1276 (“The remedies available under the 
IDEA would not appear to be well suited to addressing past physical injuries adequately; 
such injuries typically are remedied through an award of monetary damages.”). 
 241 See Charlie F., 98 F3d at 991 (finding that money damages are not available as 
relief under the IDEA). 
 242 See Part III.C.2. 
 243 Burlington, 471 US at 370. 
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student’s disability, lifelong consequences can ensue for that 
student—the physical and emotional trauma of an arrest, a 
black mark on their educational record, and potentially even 
criminal proceedings.244 This wrong might arguably fall outside 
of a denial of a FAPE (a student could surely be arrested in a 
library or a public theater). But there is a strong case to be made 
that this form of discrimination would never happen in a library 
or a public theater: teachers are uniquely situated to know 
about a student’s disability, particularly when it is invisible, and 
uniquely responsible for implementing the de-escalation strate-
gies mandated by the IEP—which should not include resorting 
to the juvenile justice system. For instance, if a child with an 
emotional disability has a history of throwing chairs, his IEP 
will almost surely mandate a particular adult response when 
this behavior occurs. If the child throws a chair and the teacher 
instead calls the police, then she has ignored the IEP, which 
would be a uniquely educational injury and likely a denial of a 
FAPE. Unlike the teacher, a librarian could not know of the 
child’s disability nor would it be her responsibility to react dif-
ferently than she would with any other person behaving simi-
larly. In a case in which a disabled student is arrested in con-
travention of his IEP, compensatory education could account for 
the lost learning time but not for the emotional and physical 
trauma of being shunted into the criminal justice system be-
cause of his disability by the educators charged with helping 
him succeed.245 
In sum, this discussion serves to highlight that there are in-
deed cases that are FAPE-centric under the Fry test for which 
damages are the most appropriate relief. When such a case arises, 
the facts tend to be appalling: they implicate pain, suffering, and 
 
 244 For a discussion of the consequences of in-school interaction with the criminal 
justice system, see Michelle Mbekeani-Wiley, Handcuffs in Hallways: The State of Polic-
ing in Chicago Public Schools *17–18 (Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, 
Feb 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/RBK7-RVS5. 
 245 This argument has been raised, albeit rarely. See J.E.B. v Independent School 
District No. 720, 2007 WL 1544611, *4 (D Minn). The court did not reach the merits of 
whether the in-school arrests constituted a denial of a FAPE in that case because litiga-
tion occurred after a full due process hearing. Not only did the district court defer to the 
IHO’s judgment that a FAPE was not denied without much further analysis, but because 
the case predated Endrew F., the Eighth Circuit’s FAPE standard was lower (only 
“some” as opposed to “no educational benefit”). Id. See also Garcia v City of McAllen, 
2013 WL 6589426, *5 (SD Tex) (determining, pre-Fry, that a claim for false arrest was 
not brought under the IDEA when the plaintiffs also did not argue that the arrest 
amounted to a denial of a FAPE). 
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emotional distress that compensatory education or the like can-
not completely redress.246 This question appears not in the typi-
cal IDEA cases, which are redressable with well-established 
IDEA forms of relief, but instead in cases in which it is clear 
that compensatory education or similar compensation will not 
suffice to right the wrong. 
4. Policy implications for waiving exhaustion. 
The IDEA statutory scheme was designed to remedy the in-
justice of special education students languishing in classrooms: 
“3.9 million children are waiting for the fundamental equal edu-
cational opportunities on which our Nation is based. This is not 
right.”247 Insisting on exhaustion will systematically underdeter 
schools from gross misconduct that is remediable in these types 
of cases.248 Exhaustion, by design, functions as a filtration sys-
tem.249 Parents must endure a due process hearing—and in some 
states, mediation before or an appeal after—before filing in 
court. These steps are not merely red tape; a due process hear-
ing, while easier and more accessible than a civil suit, still re-
quires evidence gathering, written briefs, and witnesses. Even if 
the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the hearing costs time and money. 
All the while, the IHO lacks the authority to provide the relief 
sought, which in some cases will be the most appropriate relief. 
As a result, one can infer that many families are simply not get-
ting their day in court.250 As a coalition of disability advocates 
wrote in support of the Frys: “Justice is not merely delayed for 
those children; the spectre of months or years of costly and cate-
gorically futile proceedings before being allowed to seek the re-
lief they plainly possess under civil rights laws deters many 
from seeking justice in the first place.”251 While neither requiring 
 
 246 See Part III.C.1. 
 247 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Hearings on S 6 before the 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
94th Cong, 1st Sess 1–2 (1975) (statement of Sen Randolph). 
 248 See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L J 656, 663 
(1975) (describing the fault system’s reliance on, with some limitations, “deterrence . . . 
as to what behavior is worthwhile”). 
 249 See Wasserman, 29 J Natl Assoc Admin L Judiciary at 360–61 (cited in note 63). 
 250 See Enid Campbell, Judicial Review and Appeals as Alternative Remedies, 9 
Monash U L Rev 14, 53 (1982) (“[T]he cost of litigating is [ ] a deterrent to many persons 
with justiciable grievances.”). 
 251 Brief of National Disability Rights Network, Disability Rights New York, Equip for 
Equality, and Autistic Self Advocacy Network as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
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nor waiving exhaustion changes the school’s potential exposure 
to damages, the additional process does, in reality, prevent at 
least some, if not many, damages cases from making it to federal 
court. By extension, schools, school districts, and state education 
agencies are not always held accountable to the fullest extent (or 
at all). This gap creates underdeterrence against the kinds of ex-
treme misconduct that led to these types of claims.252 
Of course, this is fundamentally an empirical claim, and one 
for which the limited data provide tentative support. The avail-
able data show that some jurisdictions field several thousands of 
IDEA complaints each year (totaling annually, on average, more 
than 17,000 complaints nationwide).253 Only a small portion, 
nearly 3,000 nationwide, lead to adjudication in a due process 
hearing each year.254 Although that is a relatively small propor-
tion of complaints, even fewer claims go to court. The data on 
judicial decisions of IDEA claims are even more limited, but 
suggest that only a small portion of those adjudications proceed 
to court—about 124 per year.255 Inferences from these data are 
admittedly limited in many ways. For one, the data fail to count 
unreported cases, suggesting underinclusion; for another, they 
do not reflect cases that preemptively moved straight to court 
without exhausting, suggesting overinclusion. Moreover, they 
say nothing of the motivations of plaintiffs who choose to con-
tinue beyond the due process hearing, nor, for that matter, of 
those who choose not to. But these studies at least provide some 
baseline empirical data for the volume of special education com-
plaints that do not see a forum that can provide damages. 
 
Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, Docket No 15-497, *4 (US filed Aug 29, 2016) 
(available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4524541). 
 252 See Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv L Rev 1133, 
1218 (1977) (explaining that in the analogous—and sometimes identical, when IDEA 
cases arise under this statute—§ 1983 context that damage remedies can be viewed “as a 
means of deterring injurious conduct” and that “[d]amage remedies imposed on govern-
mental entities could serve to prevent injuries to individuals by the system as a whole”). 
See also generally Calabresi, 84 Yale L J 656 (cited in note 248) (explaining how the tort 
system promotes optimal deterrence by making those who have committed violations pay 
damages). 
 253 Perry A. Zirkel, Longitudinal Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 
Educ L Rptr 1, 10–11 (2014) (Appendix). 
 254 Id. It is also worth noting that the number of hearings by jurisdiction varies sig-
nificantly. Some states have fewer than ten hearings annually, on average, while some 
have several hundred. 
 255 Perry A. Zirkel and Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation: 
An Updated Analysis, 265 Ed L Rptr 1, 5 (2011) (Table 2). The data compiled by the au-
thors counted cases from 2000 to 2009 using Westlaw’s KeyCite system. 
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Turning to an example illustrating deterrence in practice, 
allowing exhaustion in a case involving an in-school arrest 
would have a two-fold effect. First, such a rule would deter over-
use of school resource officers (uniformed police officers sta-
tioned at schools). Admittedly, such a deterrent effect would be 
small: not all in-school arrests are of children with IEPs nor are 
all in-school arrests of children with IEPs related to a denial of a 
FAPE. Nonetheless, many are.256 Waiving exhaustion might re-
duce those cases to some extent and compel more faithful intro-
duction and implementation of de-escalation techniques instead 
of dependence on police. In addition, waiving exhaustion may 
also help clear a path to justice for children who ought to have 
been nurtured at school but instead were arrested. 
This example is particularly salient in the context of the 
school-to-prison pipeline and its disproportionate impact on both 
students of color and students with disabilities. Youth of color 
are both overrepresented in special education (and certain spe-
cial education categories in particular) and in school disci-
pline.257 Youth in the juvenile justice system are also several 
times more likely to need special education services than child-
ren outside of the system.258 According to the US Department of 
Education, students served by the IDEA “represent a quarter of 
students arrested and referred to law enforcement, even though 
they are only 12% of the overall student population.”259 More-
over, and perhaps unsurprisingly, a racial disparity is also re-
flected in the population of students with disabilities arrested in 
school. In Chicago in 2013, about 40 percent of students receiv-
ing IDEA services were black, but of the 567 school-based arrests 
of IDEA students, nearly 70 percent were of black students.260 
 
 256 See US Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data Col-
lection Data Snapshot: School Discipline (Mar 21, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QWP9-Q89Z. 
 257 See generally Torin D. Togut, The Gestalt of the School-to-Prison Pipeline: The 
Duality of Overrepresentation of Minorities in Special Education and Racial Disparity in 
School Discipline on Minorities, 20 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 163 (2011). 
 258 Amanda Merkwae, Note, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct 
of School Resource Officers, 21 Mich J Race & L 147, 152 (2016). 
 259 Data Snapshot: School Discipline at *1 (cited in note 256). 
 260 Civil Rights Data Collection: Discipline of Students with Disabilities—School-
Related Arrest, City of Chicago SD 299 (Department of Education), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PJ4P-BXTU. This is not unique to Chicago. In Boston in 2013, black stu-
dents accounted for fewer than half of students receiving special education, but more 
than three-quarters of in-school arrests of special education students were of black stu-
dents. US Department of Education, Civil Rights Data Collection: Discipline of Students 
with Disabilities—School-Related Arrest, Boston (Department of Education), archived at 
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Again, not every arrest will amount to a denial of a FAPE.261 But 
in the face of this disparate impact, deterring, even slightly, the 
use of school resource officers for student behavior can only help 
schools’ most vulnerable populations. 
The more common examples, albeit still rare in the scheme 
of special education law, are cases like Abraham’s, along with 
Witte and Covington. In these cases, the physical and psycholog-
ical harms stemming from the alleged abuse at the hands of ed-
ucators are readily apparent.262 Waiving exhaustion in cases like 
this permits swifter awards of compensatory or, when appropri-
ate, punitive damages. In turn, those judgments deter schools 
and districts from committing these egregious violations. The 
alternative is a due process hearing, a proceeding which both 
cannot grant full redress for the harms incurred and which 
wastes time, money, and goodwill for all parties. For most IDEA 
cases, those faults might be forgivable because of exhaustion’s 
merits. For these cases, in which the FAPE denial is of the nature 
that only compensatory damages can redress the student’s injury, 
justice requires swift and full resolution, which can be achieved 
only in court. 
5. Addressing the merits of requiring exhaustion. 
The most commonly cited—and perhaps the most compel-
ling—concern with respect to waiving exhaustion is that allow-
ing waiver will create a pleading standard by which parents can 
circumvent the due process hearing by merely asking for money.263 
This is not an invalid concern, but it is overblown. First, for fam-
ilies with claims that are redressable by IDEA relief (not those 
who are the subject of this Comment), due process is a more 
attractive procedure than civil litigation. Said differently, for 
 
http://perma.cc/7W8Y-XDMD. In Los Angeles, black students constituted nearly 11 per-
cent of the population receiving IDEA services, but 30 percent of arrests of IDEA stu-
dents. US Department of Education, Civil Rights Data Collection: Discipline of Students 
with Disabilities—School-Related Arrest, Los Angeles Unified (Department of Education), 
archived at http://perma.cc/92EM-8AVT. Where data are available, the list could go on. 
 261 Not all arrests might amount to a denial of a FAPE, but it would be a mistake to 
think that students are arrested in schools for only the most serious of crimes. Many in-
school arrests are for highly trivial behaviors. See Merkwae, Note, 21 Mich J Race & L at 
154 (cited in note 258) (noting that “students are now being ticketed or charged with 
crimes for behaviors that teachers or school administrators previously addressed” and 
citing examples, such as an in-school arrest for doodling on a desk). 
 262 See Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071 at *1–3; Witte, 197 F3d at 1272–74; Covington, 
205 F3d at 913–14. 
 263 See, for example, Polera, 288 F3d at 489. 
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families that can get relief from due process, the nature of the 
procedure incentivizes proceeding through that route rather 
than attempting to demand damages in court. The due process 
hearing is less burdensome than litigation; it is more informal 
and accessible to parents proceeding pro se; disputes may be re-
solved in mediation; and the hearing officer, while unable to give 
compensatory or punitive damages as relief, nonetheless has lat-
itude to craft many equitable remedies.264 Despite the hearing 
officer’s breadth of available relief, some injuries simply cannot 
be redressed by what the IHO can give. Nonetheless, for most 
IDEA cases, the due process hearing is likely the more attractive 
procedure—so long, of course, as that procedure can give mean-
ingful relief to the aggrieved family. Waiving exhaustion is mer-
ited in the cases in which it cannot. 
Even more fundamentally, the “pleading standard” com-
plaint ignores the fact that the relief sought must still fit the 
injury alleged. As discussed in Parts III.C.1–3, for most IDEA 
cases, money damages will simply not be the most appropriate 
form of relief. The cases in which this is a relevant question are 
rare, and the facts involve some kind of above-and-beyond viola-
tion that merits damages over IDEA relief. This solution re-
quires judges to sort out the types of claims for which money 
damages are appropriate from the run-of-the-mill cases in which 
compensatory education (or the like) would be adequate.265 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit in 
Charlie F., doubted this was possible: “Perhaps Charlie’s ad-
verse reaction to the events of fourth grade cannot be overcome 
by services available under the IDEA and the regulations, so 
that in the end money is the only balm. But parents cannot 
know that without asking, any more than we can.”266 His con-
cerns are misguided. Determining whether the desired relief fits 
the facts is what judges do all the time when faced with civil lit-
igation. It is not a stretch to say that judges are capable of 
weeding out those unique cases in which damages are the most 
 
 264 See Reid, 401 F3d at 523–24. 
 265 This solution also trusts that judges can spot a prayer for prospective services 
disguised as a prayer for compensatory damages. See Payne, 653 F3d at 877: 
If the measure of a plaintiff’s damages is the cost of counseling, tutoring, or 
private schooling—relief available under the IDEA—then the IDEA requires 
exhaustion. In such a case, the plaintiffs are seeking the same relief, even if 
they are willing to accept cash in lieu of services in kind. 
 266 Charlie F., 98 F3d at 993. 
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appropriate relief. Indeed, judges should scrutinize the com-
plaint to determine whether the prayer for compensatory or 
punitive damages fits the alleged injury.267 
Of course, due process hearings have other merits. As a 
general matter, exhaustion of administrative remedies allows 
for the development of a record. In addition, IHOs possess deep, 
relevant experience in this area of the law, which is nontrivial 
when dealing with the alphabet soup of education law. State ed-
ucation agencies have an interest in resolving the dispute locally. 
These are good reasons for due process hearings, and those 
benefits will necessarily be sacrificed each time exhaustion is 
waived. However, these are reasons meriting caution, not for re-
quiring universal exhaustion. Even post-Fry, these benefits apply 
with equal force but are nonetheless forgone by waiving exhaus-
tion when the gravamen of the complaint does not allege a den-
ial of a FAPE; yet the Court has put its imprimatur on waiver in 
that class of cases. The Court, then, is willing to sacrifice these 
benefits in favor of faithful adherence to the statute. As ex-
plained in this Part, the statute demands waiver in cases that 
allege a denial of a FAPE but properly demand a form of relief 
that the IDEA cannot provide as well. 
In addition, due process hearings prevent at least some liti-
gation from clogging judges’ dockets. Nonetheless, due process 
hearings are patently futile for parents seeking these particular 
forms of relief, and futility is a well-established exception to ex-
haustion.268 Indeed, it is deeply inefficient to force parents 
through a hearing that, by law, cannot grant the relief they are 
seeking. Batchelor, despite insisting on exhaustion, demon-
strates the inefficient use of resources that stems from mandat-
ing exhaustion in these cases. The Third Circuit wrote that 
“after exhaustion, [the student] may very well file a complaint 
containing virtually identical claims as asserted in the” original 
complaint.269 In essence, then, both the plaintiffs and schools 
must go through litigation twice, the first time with no chance of 
students walking away with their problem adequately solved if 
compensatory or punitive damages were appropriate all along. 
 
 267 See FRCP 8(a) (stating that a complaint must both specify the relief the plaintiff 
seeks and the reasons why the plaintiff is entitled to that relief). 
 268 See Hoeft, 967 F2d at 1303 (“Excusing exhaustion in cases of futility and inade-
quacy is based both on general exhaustion principles and on the legislative history of the 
IDEA.”) (citation omitted). 
 269 Batchelor, 759 F3d at 278 n 15. 
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So while exhaustion might prevent some cases from making it to 
court, IHO officers will see more cases for which they cannot 
provide the appropriate relief. As the solicitor general pointed 
out in his brief for the Frys, “requiring exhaustion would force 
the plaintiff (and school district) to participate in a time-
consuming, adversarial, and potentially costly due process hear-
ing that will likely create unnecessary administrative burdens 
for all involved.”270 This might prevent a case from entering the 
courtroom, but it also uses taxpayer dollars to fund an extrane-
ous hearing as a sham procedural prerequisite. Moreover, pro-
longing the adversarial process risks eroding the relationship 
between the parties, reducing the chances of a mutually agree-
able settlement. Such a requirement does not provide justice for 
these children—at best, it delays it. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued in favor of waiving the exhaus-
tion requirement when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief for 
denial of a FAPE. This conclusion is rooted in statutory inter-
pretation of § 1415(l) as informed by the plain-language reading 
of the provision, case law, and comparable statutes. Moreover, 
such a conclusion is both aligned with the purpose of the IDEA 
and sound as a matter of policy. 
As explained in Part III, this Comment does not argue for a 
pleading standard. Parents cannot simply say the magic words 
“compensatory damages” and evade the due process hearing. 
Judges should scrutinize the plaintiff ’s complaint to ensure that 
the relief requested is, indeed, the appropriate form of relief. 
Judges are free, too, to dismiss a case insofar as the relief sought 
is available under the IDEA while letting litigation continue to 
the extent that damages are the appropriate remedy.271 Even so, 
concurrent litigation will not always be necessary—if the family 
is happy with the current IEP but suing for a past denial of a 
FAPE, for example, they may choose to only seek relief that is 
unavailable under the IDEA. 
Moreover, the number of cases in which that is the case is 
likely small. Those cases distinguish themselves from run-of-
the-mill IDEA cases because of their egregious fact patterns—
 
 270 Solicitor General Brief at *27 (cited in note 95). 
 271 This is the approach taken in a recent post-Fry district-court case. See A.M. v 
Fresno Unified School District, 2017 WL 6209389, *8–10 (ED Cal). 
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compensatory education or other IDEA relief is simply not com-
mensurate with the alleged injury. As in the case of Abraham in 
Los Angeles, the harm underlying the prayer for relief cannot be 
addressed by typical IDEA remedies. Judges are well equipped 
to weed out these cases. 
The common thread between these kinds of cases, in which 
a child is denied a FAPE and monetary relief is appropriate, is 
that helping the student catch up academically is not enough. 
These students deserve more justice than mere school-related 
services can provide, a notion rooted in sound legal principles of 
relief and in the purpose of the IDEA as a protection for disabled 
children against apathetic schools. Moreover, schools and dis-
tricts are currently not paying for the most egregious harms 
they commit against disabled students, at least not fully or 
promptly. 
When a student like Abraham—who has endured trauma at 
the hands of trusted adults, but is, by all accounts, now doing 
fine—asks for relief from the courts, we crave both justice on his 
behalf and assurance that children like him will not suffer going 
forward. Moreover, we hope that the procedures that get us to 
this result are swift. In response to Justice Kagan’s question in 
footnotes four and eight of Fry, the solution is simple and rooted 
in the text of § 1415(l). The answer must be to waive exhaustion 
in cases in which the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but 
requests relief that is unavailable under the IDEA. 
